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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). This appeal was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
Appellees and Cross-Appellants do not dispute or restate the issues presented by 
the Defendants and Appellants. 
In addition to Appellants, Appellees state the following as the issues for 
Appellees' Cross-Appeal. 
Issue 1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by setting aside the jury's verdict 
on March 26, 2003, and by ordering a new trial because the jury did not "apportion" the 
damages among the several Defendants, when the Defendants had never pleaded for nor 
requested apportionment until after trial and the verdict. 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: Reviewed for abuse of discretion 
and error of law. A trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial absent a showing of at 
least one of the circumstances specified in Utah R. Civil P. 59(a). Schindler v. Schindler, 
116 P.2d 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Issue 2. Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Plaintiffs' claim for 
fraud/constructive fraud/ negligent misrepresentation and Plaintiffs' claim under Utah's 
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Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, Utah Code Aim. § 76-10-1601, et seq. because 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges those causes of action. 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a 
question of law, and the court gives the trial court's ruling no deference and reviews it 
under a correctness standard. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 211 P.2d 
194, 196 (Utah 1991). 
Issue 3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Plaintiffs leave to file a 
Third Amended Complaint, stating the motion and complaint were not "timely," would 
require the court to adjudicate church doctrine, and lacked an indispensable party. 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: This Court reviews refusal to grant 
motion to amend for abuse of discretion. Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 138, 1389 (Utah 
1996) CTimm,II"), quoting Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Utah 1993) 
("Timm,I"). 
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PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL 
Appellees' issues were argued by Plaintiffs in their memoranda opposing the Rule 
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss (R. 192, 420, 1093 and 1122), the memorandum opposing the 
motion for new trial (R. 1001), and the reply memorandum in support of their motion for 
leave to amend (R. 1475). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
1. U.S. Constitution, Amendment I. (Add. A) 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37, et seq. (Add. B) (Utah Liability Reform Act) 
3. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). (Add. C) 
4. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 19. (Add. C) 
5. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17(d). (Add. C) 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1601, et seq. (Add. D) (Utah Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
This is a fraud, conspiracy and breach of promise action by Plaintiffs against 
Defendant leaders of the True and Living Church ("TLC"), who obtained Plaintiffs' homes, 
property and assets by mis representations, fraud, breaches of promise, and unlawful activity. 
Plaintiffs/ Appellees cross-appeal from the Orders of the Sixth Judicial District Court, 
Sanpete County, which are: "Order on Motions Regarding Judgment and New Trial" entered 
February 7, 2003, wherein a new trial was granted Defendants (Add. J); "Order Regarding 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss" entered September 24, 2003 (Add. F); "Order on Motion 
to File Third Amended Complaint" entered November 12, 2003 (Add. G); and, "Order 
Continuing Trial" entered November 12, 2003, wherein the Court directed that the above 
Orders be certified as a final judgment on all of Plaintiffs' claims, except for Plaintiffs' 
breach of contract claim. (R. 1555, Add. K). 
Plaintiffs' cross-appeal seeks reversal of the trial court's Order setting aside the jury 
verdict and granting a new trial. (R. 1052, Add. J). The 2002 jury's verdict (Add. H) should 
be reinstated and judgment entered thereon. In the alternative, Plaintiffs appeal the trial 
court's subsequent dismissal of Plaintiffs' three causes of action, and refused leave to amend. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: 
In April 1998, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint alleging claims against all Defendants 
for (1) breach of contract; (2) fraud, constructive fraud or negligent misrepresentation; (3) 
unjust enrichment or implied contract, or fraudulent conversion; (4) violation of the "Pattern 
of Unlawful Activity Act," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1601, et. seq.; and, (5) intentional 
infliction of emotional harm. (R. 1-8). Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (Memorandum, 
R. 59). On January 4, 1999, the trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss the second cause 
of action for fraud and constructive fraud, allowing Plaintiffs to amend their fraud allegations 
in the Complaint. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint was filed March 10, 1999. (R. 318). 
Thereafter, Defendants again moved to dismiss the claims by Plaintiff Hancock (Memo., R. 
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326). That motion was denied by the court on August 19,1999. (R. 466). The Defendants 
then filed various Answers. (R. 292, 302, 310.) 
On December 31,2001, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting, 
inter alia, the same issues now raised on appeal. (Memo., R. 666). That motion was denied 
January 17, 2002 (R. 771), and the matter proceeded to a jury trial for four days in January 
2002. All five of Plaintiffs' causes of action were tried to the jury, and the jury reached a 
verdict awarding $290,325.00 in damages to Plaintiffs for Defendants' breach of contract, 
fraud, and for infliction of emotional distress. (Minutes, R. 832-4; Verdict, Add. H). No 
issue of "apportionment" of damages was raised by Appellants injury instructions or to the 
court. 
The Plaintiffs proposed the entry of a Final Judgment that implemented the jury's 
verdict. Defendants objected to the proposed judgments in which Defendants were held 
jointly and severally liable, consistent with the jury's verdict. (R. 894). For the first time. 
Defendants claimed that the judgment should be apportioned because there should not be 
joint and several liability. (R. 898.) 
On August 5, 2002, the trial court signed and entered a final Judgment — the Fourth 
Proposed Judgment. (R. 969; Add. I). 
Defendants filed objections to the entry of the Judgment, a Motion for a New Trial, 
and a Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment. (R. 987,1007,1024.) In September 2002, the 
trial court reversed itself, and set aside the entered Judgment (Add. I), stating that there 
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wasn't enough information for the court to apportion the damages among the Defendants. 
(R. 1052.) Six months later, the trial court finally entered its order to set aside the jury 
verdict and grant a new trial. (R. 1052, Add. J.) 
Faced with a new trial, Plaintiffs proposed a Second Amended Complaint in February 
2003. (R. 1058.) Defendants filed a third Motion to Dismiss the amended complaint, 
claiming that the Plaintiffs' amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted and all five of Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed. (R.1069.) 
Defendants also filed, for the first time, a motion to oppose joint and several liability, and a 
request to have fault apportioned under the Utah Liability Reform Act. (R. 1086.) In a July 
25,2003 Order, the trial court accepted the Second Amended Complaint as filed. (R. 1238, 
1248.) 
Almost immediately after accepting the Second Amended Complaint, the trial court 
then ruled in Defendants' favor on their third Motion to Dismiss on August 8, 2003. The 
court dismissed Plaintiffs' second cause of action for fraud/constructive fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation, Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action for violation of Utah's Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity Act, and Plaintiffs' fifth cause of action for intentional infliction of 
emotional harm. (Add. F.) The court ruled that the fraud, misrepresentation, racketeering 
and intentional infliction claims were not alleged with sufficient specificity (Add. F, R. 1257-
8), even though the Plaintiffs had testified at length about these specific facts in the 2002 
trial. 
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The court did not dismiss Plaintiffs' first cause of action for breach of contract or the 
third cause of action for unjust enrichment, and those claims still remain below for 
determination. (R. 1254-60.) After this dismissal, Plaintiffs moved for leave to file a Third 
Amended Complaint to be more specific in the allegations of fraud, misrepresentation and 
infliction.1 (Memo., R. 1322). The trial court denied Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend 
in an Order entered October 17,2003. (R. 1511, Add. G.) The court stated that the proposed 
amended complaint was not timely, that complete relief could not be afforded because not 
all persons were joined as Defendants, and that the court was impermissibly required to 
adjudicate "church doctrine." (R. 1558-62.) Effectively, the three causes of action were 
dismissed and leave to amend to correct any deficiency was refused. 
The parties stipulated that the October 28,2003 trial date should be continued and that 
the court's Order and the prior order of partial dismissal could be certified final under Rule 
54(b), Utah R. Civil P. The trial court entered its dismissal and denial of leave to amend as 
a final judgment (R. 1555, Add. K) to allow this appeal. Defendants' appeal and Plaintiffs' 
cross-appeal from these various orders then resulted. (R. 1564, 1567.) 
Just because the trial court purported to certify as final its non-final declination to 
dismiss all claims does not justify Defendants' appeal. Following the court's dismissal of 
three of Plaintiffs' causes of action (Add. F ) and denial of leave to amend their complaint 
!The proposed Third Amended Complaint is in the trial court's file but was 
excluded and omitted by the clerk from the record index and record on appeal. 
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(Add. G), the trial court "certified" its Order Regarding Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as 
being final for purposes of appeal. {See R. 1555, Order Continuing Trial, November 12, 
2003, Add. K.) The effect of the Rule 54(b) Orders was to certify as final the dismissal of 
Plaintiffs' fraud, misrepresentation, infliction and unlawful activity claims, as well as the 
refusal to dismiss the breach of contract and unjust enrichment allegations. 
Statement of Facts: 
The following facts are alleged in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint 
("Complaint"- Add. E) and were testified at trial (Transcript, R. 1575) and in the published 
depositions of L Douglas Jordan and William Lythgow. 
Plaintiffs Kaziah May Hancock and Cindy Stewart are women residing in Sanpete 
County, Utah. Defendant The True and Living Church of Jesus Christ of Saints of the Last 
Days (the "TLC") is an unincorporated association headquartered in Sanpete County. Each 
of the individual Defendants resided in Sanpete County during the events alleged in the 
Complaint and were agents of the TLC. Defendant James D. Harmston is the founder and 
leader of the TLC and the association. (R. 1060-61.) 
In November 1993, Plaintiff Hancock became affiliated with the TLC. At that time, 
Ms. Hancock owned and lived on her ranch in Indianola, Utah. In March 1996, Ms. Hancock 
met with leaders of the TLC, who denominated themselves as the "Bishopric." These 
Bishopric members were Defendants Keith Larson, Kay Crabtree and Kent Braddy. The 
purpose of the meeting was to discuss an agreement to exchange goods and services. Ms. 
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Hancock was asked to turn over the sale proceeds that she received from the sale of her 
Indianola ranch to the TLC. In exchange, the Defendants promised Ms. Hancock that she 
would receive from them in return property and financial support, which were referred to as 
a "stewardship." The Complaint alleges that the "stewardship" was to be land with water, 
a place where Ms. Hancock could continue to raise animals as she had on the ranch in 
Indianola. More specifically, the parties discussed 20 acres of land and sufficient water for 
five animals per acre. (R. 537-40.) The promise of this property and support in exchange 
for the funds Ms. Hancock would turn over, or "consecrate," to the TLC was made by the 
individual Defendants as professed representations of the TLC. (R. 1061-63). 
Plaintiff Stewart became affiliated with the TLC on April 11,1995. In March 1996, 
Ms. Stewart was asked by the Defendant leaders of the TLC to liquidate her retirement 
savings account and turn over the funds to Defendant Harmston for the TLC. Harmston, and 
other Defendants, promised Ms. Stewart that they would repay her the full amount of her 
retirement fund, together with payment to her of any costs and penalties for her early 
withdrawal of the retirement funds. Harmston, acting individually and as the head of the 
TLC, promised Ms. Stewart that he, individually, and/or the TLC would "always support 
her," and thus she should not be concerned about liquidating her IRA account. (R. 1062-63). 
In order to gain the confidence of the Plaintiffs and further induce Plaintiffs' 
agreement, Harmston and the other Defendants represented to Plaintiffs that Harmston was 
the "sole spokesman on earth for God" and made other similar religious claims. (R. 1063.) 
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Plaintiffs Hancock and Stewart were persuaded by the importunings and 
representations of Defendants Harmston, Larson, Crabtree, Braddy, and other Defendants, 
and believed Defendants' promises were made both personally and on behalf of the TLC. 
Hancock and Stewart relied on those representations and promises that each would receive 
property and support in exchange for the money, goods and services they gave to Harmston 
for the TLC. Hancock completed the sale of her ranch property in Indianola, Utah, and 
turned over the proceeds to the TLC - over $ 131,000.00. Stewart withdrew her entire IRA 
account of over $15,700.00 and gave the money to the TLC. (R. 1064-65.) 
Not too long thereafter, in May 1997, Ms. Stewart was expelled from membership in 
the TLC. Ms. Hancock was asked to leave the TLC association in August 1997. Ms. 
Hancock never received the support or property she had been promised in consideration for 
turning over her ranch sale proceeds. Ms. Stewart never received the repayment of her IRA 
monies and tax liabilities as promised. As a result of Defendants' false and misleading 
representations and promises, Defendants have been unjustly enriched, and Ms. Hancock 
alleged damages of $250,000.00 and Ms. Stewart alleged damages of at least$ 15,766.00. (R. 
1067-68.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs Kaziah Hancock and Cindy Stewart appeal the trial court decisions setting 
aside their jury verdict of January, 2002, and the Judgment thereon which had awarded them 
damages on their claims of breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation and intentional 
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infliction of emotional harm. After setting aside the verdict and ordering a new trial, the 
court then improperly dismissed Plaintiffs fraud, misrepresentation and Unlawful Activity 
counts of their amended complaint, denying leave to amend. The Judgment on the verdict 
should be reinstated. The trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the verdict and 
judgment because (1) prior to trial and the verdict, Defendants did not plead or request 
apportionment of liability, thereby waiving that defense, and (2) the Liability Reform Act did 
not abolish Defendant's joint and several liability for their fraud, misrepresentation, and/or 
breach of contract. The Act does not apply in this case. 
After the verdict on all claims was set aside, the trial court erred in dismissing the 
fraud, misrepresentation and unlawful activity claims in Plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint in August, 2003, particularly when these allegations had already been tried to the 
jury, as well as surviving prior rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. After a four-day trial of the 
matter in January, 2002, sufficient evidence had been presented to establish the claims and 
Defendants were well aware of the nature and facts of the allegations against them. In the 
event the Judgment is not reinstated, these claims should be restored and proceed to new trial. 
Following the dismissal of three of Plaintiffs' claims in August, 2003, and with new 
trial scheduled, the trial court abused its discretion by denying Plaintiffs leave to further 
amend their complaint. The court's rational - that the amendment was untimely, required 
the court to adjudicate church doctrine, and lacked a party, Douglas Jordan, without whom 
complete relief could not be afforded - are not supported by any legal analysis or authority 
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properly applied to the facts. Plaintiffs's proposed Third Amended Complaint was filed 
close in time to the trial court's surprising reversal of its earlier rulings that Plaintiffs claims 
were sufficient pleaded, and after the parties had already tried the claims. 
Plaintiffs claims do not require the Court to adjudicate any church doctrine of the 
TLC. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has no bearing on this case and is not 
a defense. Neither the Establishment Clause nor the Free Exercise Clause bar the Plaintiffs' 
access to the courts for redress of the Defendants' misrepresentations, fraud and breaches of 
their agreements. 
The third reason argued by Defendants for dismissal is the lack of an "indispensable 
party." Defendants never proposed a theory by which Douglas Jordan was indispensable to 
the proceedings and failed to meet any requirement of Utah Rule Civil Procedure 19 
regarding necessary or indispensable parties. The trial court's conclusion was erroneous. 
In all, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Plaintiffs leave to amend to respond 
to the motions of Defendants. If necessary, the Plaintiffs should be allowed to amend to cure 
any sufficiency or allegations of their complaint. 
Defendants have appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss the 
remaining claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Defendants' arguments are 
not supported by authorities nor persuasively reasoned. Plaintiffs' persuasive analysis and 
arguments regarding the above issues apply equally to refute the Defendants' contentions 
that the entire case should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
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Case No. 20030984-CA 
Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Thome. 
This case is before the court on a "Motion to Dismiss 
Issue 1 Contained in the Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants." 
After a jury trial, Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants 
Kazia May Hancock and Cindy Stewart obtained a judgment against 
Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees The True and Living Church 
of Jesus Christ of Saints of the Last Days and the named 
individual defendants (the Church Defendants). In an order 
entered on February 7, 2 003, the district court set aside the 
judgment and granted a motion for new trial. Hancock and Stewart 
did not seek permission to appeal that interlocutory order under 
rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and, instead, 
filed a Second Amended Complaint. The district court 
subsequently granted, in part, and denied, in part, a motion to 
dismiss the complaint. The district court certified the August 
7, 2003 order, which dismissed causes of action alleging fraud, 
constructive fraud or negligent misrepresentation, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and claims under the Utah 
Pattern of Unlawful Activities Act, as final for purposes of 
appeal. The same order denied a motion to dismiss the causes of 
action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, which remain 
pending in the district court. 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits the 
trial court to "direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or 
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an 
express determination by the court that there is no just reason 
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of 
judgment." Utah R. Civ.' P. 54(b). In order to be eligible for 
certification, an order must be one that could be characterized 
as a final judgment as to one or more separate claims. See 
Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1101 
(Utah 1991). "[T]he judgment appealed from must have been 
entered on an order that would be appealable but for the fact 
that other claims . . . remain in the action." Id. 
The August 7, 2003 order may have been eligible for 
certification under rule 54(b) insofar as it wholly disposed of 
one or more separate claims; however, it was not eligible for 
certification insofar as it denied a motion to dismiss the breach 
of contract and unjust enrichment causes of action. 
Nevertheless, the Church Defendants appealed the partial denial 
of their motion to dismiss. Hancock and Stewart appealed the 
partial grant of the motion. "A timely appeal from an order 
certified under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that 
the appellate court determined is not final may, in the 
discretion of the appellate court, be considered by the appellate 
court as a petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory 
order." Utah R. App. P. 5(a). In the interest of judicial 
economy, we invoke this limited exception to allow review of the 
August 7, 2003 order in its entirety, along with the related 
October 16, 2 003 order denying a motion to amend the complaint. 
The Church Defendants move to partially dismiss Hancock and 
Stewart's appeal to the extent that they also seek reversal of 
the February 7, 2003 order granting the motion for new trial on 
grounds that this order is not within the scope of this appeal. 
We agree. Hancock and Stewart did not file a timely petition for 
permission to appeal from the interlocutory order and the order 
granting a new trial was not eligible for certification as final 
under rule 54(b). They now claim that the certification of the 
August 7, 2003 order rendered all prior interlocutory orders 
final and appealable. However, the cases they rely upon each 
arose in the context of an appeal from a final judgment that 
fully concluded the case in the trial court. None of these cases 
support the assertion that in an appeal from a partial dismissal 
certified as final for appeal, this court may exercise appellate 
jurisdiction to reverse a previous order setting aside a judgment 
after an earlier trial and granting of a new trial. Hancock and 
Stewart alternatively request that we apply the exception 
contained in rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
We are generally precluded from suspending or modifying the 
provisions of rule 5(a), which governs procedures for seeking 
permission to appeal from interlocutory orders. The limited 
exception contained in rule 5(a) applies only under circumstances 
where the trial court certifies a judgment as final for purposes 
of appeal, which the appellate court later determines was not 
eligible for certification. The district court was not requested 
to, and did not attempt to, certify the February 7, 2003 order 
setting aside the judgment and granting a new trial. Therefore, 
the prerequisite to allow this court to apply the limited 
exception does not exist. In addition, we note that after the 
district court set aside, the judgment from the first trial, 
Hancock and Stewart failed to timely seek permission to appeal, 
but instead, amended their complaint, and assented to proceeding 
to trial on the Second Amended Complaint. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is granted, and the 
Cross-Appeal of Hancock and Stewart is dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction insofar as it seeks reversal of the February 7, 2003 
order setting aside the judgment following the jury trial and 
granting a new trial, and the argument contained in Issue 1 of 
the brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants Hancock and Stewart is 
stricken. The appeal and cross-appeal shall otherwise proceed to 
briefing and plenary consideration on the merits. 
DATED this M day of January, 2005. 
FOR THE COU: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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Case No. 20030984 
District Court No. 980600126 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion bv Setting Aside the 
Jury Verdict and Ordering a New Trial Because the Defendants 
Never Pleaded for nor Requested Apportionment. 
The trial court should not have set aside the jury's verdict. A trial court has no 
discretion to grant a new trial absent a showing of at least one of the specific circumstances 
in Utah R. Civil P. 59(a). Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989). After the 
verdict and judgment, Defendants' motion for a new trial (R. 1007) claimed that insufficient 
evidence supported the jury's verdict in Plaintiffs' favor, and, for the first time, requested 
apportionment of damages among the Defendants. The trial court belatedly granted the new 
trial, not specifying which, if any, circumstance(s) under Rule 59(a) supported a new trial. 
The court stated that his judgment would not stand due to the verdict's "lack of detailed 
information about Plaintiffs' claims and Defendants' actions." (R. 1052, Add. J.) Only 
months after trial, Defendants filed untimely their motion to apportion damages under the 
Liability Reform Act, which, they claimed, abolished the joint and several liability for 
damages awarded by the jury. (R. 1086.) 
Defendants contend that joint and several liability has been abolished in Utah and, 
therefore, Plaintiffs must allege the actions of each individual Defendant in order to allow 
apportionment of fault. (R. 1076). Defendants have misunderstood the Liability Reform Act 
(the "LRA"), Utah Code Ann.§ 78-27-38, (1999), effective March 3, 1998. 
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The trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the verdict and judgment because 
(I) prior to trial and the verdict, Defendants did not plead for or request apportionment of 
liability, waiving that defense; (2) Rules 17(d) and 54(c)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
provide for entry of final judgment determining the rights of the Defendants among 
themselves; and, (3) the Liability Reform Act does not abolish joint and several liability for 
fraud, misrepresentation, or breach of contract claims2. The Order Granting a New Trial 
should be reversed and the jury verdict and Judgment entered on August 5, 2002 should be 
reinstated. 
A. Defendants Waived Any Right for Apportionment of Damages By Not Raising 
the Claim Prior to Trial. 
Prior to the jury's verdict and the Judgment, the Defendants never requested any 
apportionment of liability among themselves and never raised such a defense or claim. 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, which was the basis for the 2002 trial of the matter, alleged 
that the individual defendants acted both in their individual capacities and as agents of the 
TLC in their fraudulent conduct against Plaintiffs. Their agency binds the individual 
defendants under any judgment against the TLC. In addition, under Rule 17(d), a judgment 
against the admitted unincorporated association TLC is enforceable against the joint property 
of the individual defendants and against the separate property of those defendants at trial. 
2Plaintiffs do not appeal the dismissal of their claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
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At no time prior to the verdict did Defendants seek a ruling of the court with regard to 
apportionment or ask the jury to apportion. 
Both the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (R. 318) (upon which the matter was tried) 
and the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (Add. E) (which was the subject of 
Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss) alleged that the TLC was an unincorporated 
entity, that Defendant Harmston was an individual and the founder and leader of the TLC, 
that the individual defendants made promises to Plaintiffs as officers and agents of the TLC 
and as individuals, and that the Defendants acquired money and property from the Plaintiffs 
for which they are obligated. Plaintiffs prayed for an award of damages against each 
individual Defendant. The matter was tried to a jury and a verdict rendered against all 
Defendants. (Add. H.) 
A review of the Requested Jury Instructions of both parties and those presented to the 
jury as it began its deliberations (R. 724-735, 754-762, 845-882) evidences that the 
Defendants did not propose any instruction to define fault, or joint and several liability, or 
that there be any apportionment of the damages awarded. There was no objection to the form 
of the verdict submitted. Not until after entry of the jury verdict did Defendants file any 
objection to the jury verdict (R. 894), and first argue that joint and several liability could not 
be entered under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1999). Defendants' failure to raise these 
defenses prior to trial and the verdict constituted a waiver of that issue. 
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B. Defendants are Jointly and Severally Liable as Co-Conspirators. 
Plaintiffs alleged, argued (R. 929), and presented evidence at trial that the Defendants 
acted in concert to make false representations and claims in order to obtain Plaintiffs' money, 
damage Plaintiffs and enrich themselves. Only a portion of the trial transcript is in the 
record. (R. 1575.) Therefore, the entire evidence at trial should be presumed to support the 
jury's verdict that the Defendants were jointly liable. Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786, 
787 (Utah 1994) ("On appeal from a jury verdict, we view the evidence and all inferences 
therefrom in the light most favorable to that verdict/5). 
Co-conspirators may generally be held jointly and severally liable for the damages to 
a plaintiff, InBoisjoly v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 795, 803 (D. Utah 1988), Judge 
Winder stated: "Civil conspiracy is essentially a tool allowing a plaintiff injured by the tort 
of one party to join and recover from a third party who conspired with the tortfeasor to bring 
about the tortious act or in other words, a method of imposing vicarious liability." 
Vicarious liability is distinct from joint and several liability, because it does not arise 
from actual fault, and the Liability Reform Act "does not logically extend to co-defendants 
to whom no fault can be apportioned, but who are instead subject to vicarious liability." 
Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, f 19-20,48 P.3d 941,948. Vicarious liability can 
also apply to the law of partnerships and joint ventures, where all partners are vicariously 
liable for the tortious acts of any other partner. Such liability should also extend to other 
unincorporated associations. In support of extending vicarious liability to coconspirators: 
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Membership in a civil conspiracy has been directly compared, for purposes of 
vicarious liability, to membership in a partnership. Professor Dobbs of the 
University of Arizona, describing the liability between members of a civil 
conspiracy in his recent tort treatise, states: "Vicarious liability explains these 
cases-the parties are engaged in a kind of partnership or joint venture for 
illegal or tortious purposes." 
Carl D. Adams, The "Tort" of Civil Conspiracy in Texas, 54 Baylor L. Rev. 305,317 (2002), 
quoting Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, § 340, at 936 (2000). 
In a wrongful death action, Woods v. Cole, 693 N. E. 2d 333 (111. 1998), the plaintiff 
claimed the two defendants acted in concert when one induced the other to point a gun at the 
decedent, and the second, not knowing the gun was loaded, fired the weapon. Id. at 334. 
The court first noted the Illinois statute neither exempted nor modified joint and several 
liability for concerted conduct. The court then discussed the differences between 
independent concurring tortfeasors and tortfeasors who act in concert. Id. at 336-37. The 
difference was that the "independent, concurring tortfeasor is held jointly and severally liable 
because the plaintiffs injury cannot be divided into separate portions, and because the 
tortfeasor fulfills the standard elements of tort liability, i.e., his or her tortious conduct was 
an actual and proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury." However, the tortfeasor acting in 
concert "is held jointly and severally liable for that injury because the tortfeasor is legally 
responsible for the actions of the other individuals." Id. at 336-37. 
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The Illinois court rejected the argument that apportionment was required even for 
tortious activity in concert as a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the statute.3 
The TLC Defendants argue that joint and several liability was abolished as to their 
actions against Plaintiffs but do not cite legal authority to support their contention. The 
liability of Defendants, whom the jury presumably found to have acted in concert to cause 
Plaintiffs' injury, should be joint and several. Diversified Holdings v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, 
63 P.3d 686 ("action in concert" resulted in a verdict of joint and several liability for fraud, 
not subject to the Liability Reform Act.) 
C. Defendants are Also Jointly and Severally Liable for Breach of Contract and 
Fraud, 
"On appeal from a jury verdict, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to that verdict." Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 
786,787 (Utah 1994). The trial court abused its discretion by not viewing the trial evidence 
in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. In the present case, Defendants have not 
furnished a full trial transcript, and it must be presumed that the evidence presented was 
sufficient to sustain the verdict and judgment entered. See Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Neilson, 490 P.2d 328, 329 (Utah 1971). 
zId; see also Kristopher S. Kaufman, The Liability Reform Act Subsequent to Field 
v. Boyer Co.: Sounding the Death Knell of Civil Conspiracy in Utah? 3 Utah L. Rev. 
1077,1102-06(2003). 
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As the basis of its grant of a motion for new trial, the trial court also apparently 
(without saying) interpreted the Liability Reform Act to permit apportionment of liability 
among defendants sued for breach of contract. That legal conclusion was erroneous. Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 (1999), "Fault" is defined as "any actionable breach of legal 
duty... including negligence in all it degrees " In Guardian Tide Co. of Utah v. Mitchell, 
2002 UT 63, Tf 2, 54 P.3d 130, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the statute does not 
apply to breach of contract: "[T]he tort principles of comparative negligence and agency 
liability relied on by the district court do not apply to contract actions." 
The Utah Supreme Court discussed the effect of the Liability Reform Act on joint and 
several liability in Diversified Holdings v. Turner, 2002 UT 129,63 P.3d 686. In Diversified 
Holdings, one of the issues was the jury's finding that all four defendants were jointly and 
severally liable for fraud damages and the award of all damages against each defendant 
individually. Id., 2002 UT 129,13, 63 P.3d 686. Regarding joint and several liability, the 
Court said: 
When multiple defendants are jointly and severally liable for fraud damages, 
as they are here, the full amount of that joint and several liability may form the 
basis of the actual damages against which punitive damages are assessed for 
each defendant. When multiple defendants are not jointly and severally liable, 
as they are not for negligence damages, one defendant's liability should not be 
a predicate for increasing punitive damages assessed against another. 
Id.y 2002 UT 129, f 31, 63 P.3d 686. The TLC Defendants' argument that joint and several 
liability for fraud was abolished by the Liability Reform Act is contrary to Diversified. 
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As to the actions of Defendants that resulted in damage to Plaintiffs, Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 17(d) permits Plaintiffs to sue the TLC under its common name, and: 
Any judgment obtained against the association shall bind the joint property of 
all the associates in the same manner as if all had been named parties and had 
been sued upon their joint liability. The separate property of an individual 
member of the association may not be bound by the judgment unless the 
member is named as a party and the court acquires jurisdiction over the 
member. 
Any judgment against the TLC is enforceable against the individual Defendants as the 
officers and agents of the TLC, and the separate property of those who are named and subject 
to the jurisdiction of the trial court is subject to the judgment. Plaintiffs need only allege and 
prove their claims against the TLC, its officers and agents, to bind the joint and separate 
property of these agents - the named Defendants. This was successfully done, and a jury 
verdict reached in Plaintiffs' favor against all Defendants. That verdict should be reinstated. 
The jury verdict in the present case found all Defendants jointly and severally liable 
to Plaintiffs for breach of contract damages and for fraud damages. The trial court's setting 
aside of the verdict and granting a new trial to apportion fault among the Defendants was an 
erroneous application of the statute and an abuse of discretion. 
POINT II 
Plaintiffs9 Claims Do Not Require the Trial Court to Evaluate or 
Decide the Religious Doctrines of Defendant TLC. 
Defendants raise First Amendment issues in their appeal of the partial denial of their 
motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' causes of action, arguing that their promises to Ms. Hancock 
and Ms. Stewart were in the nature of "religious doctrines" of the TLC and that such 
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doctrines are not subject to adjudication by the courts. However, Defendants' analysis and 
arguments do not make any distinction between the Establish Clause or the Free Exercise 
Clause, and neither is discussed by Defendants. (Appellants'Brief, pp. 12-13). Plaintiffs 
Hancock and Stewart have cross-appealed the trial court's abuse of discretion when it 
dismissed the fraud and misrepresentation claims and denied Plaintiffs leave to amend on the 
ground that such claims required "adjudication of church doctrine." (Order, Add. G). Again, 
the court did not discuss whether its adjudication might violate either of the religious 
amendment clauses. 
A. The Trial Court Properly Refused to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Claims for Breach of 
Contract and for Unjust Enrichment 
Relying upon Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 2001 UT 25, 
21 P.3d 198, Defendants contend that any "judicial review and interpretation of church law, 
policies, or practices" is prohibited by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
(Appellants' Brief, pp.12-13). Franco does not apply to Plaintiffs' allegations in this case. 
Plaintiff Franco sued the LDS Church and its leaders for injuries she allegedly 
suffered as a result of advice she received during ecclesiastical counseling. Franco argued 
that her claims did not require an inquiry into the LDS Church's religious doctrines, 
practices, or beliefs and that the First Amendment was inapplicable. Franco, 2001 UT 25, 
Tf8,21P.3dl98. The Utah Supreme Court relied upon the "excessive entanglement" test in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971): 
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The excessive entanglement test is, by necessity, one of degree. Indeed, 
separation of church and state cannot mean the absence of all governmental 
contact with religion, "since the complexities of modern life inevitably 
produce some contact." 16A Am. Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 422, at 405 
(1998). In light of this reality, the entanglement doctrine does not bar tort 
claims against clergy for misconduct not within the purview of the First 
Amendment, because the claims are unrelated to the religious efforts of a 
cleric. 
Franco, 2001 UT 25,114, 21 P.3d 198. 
This conclusion that Franco prescribes embroilment in "standards applicable for . . 
. clergy" applies to claims against clergy arising from ecclesiastical counseling. Franco, 
2001 UT 25, K 23, 21 P.2d 198. The Franco decision, therefore, does not bar Plaintiffs' 
claims. Here, Plaintiffs Hancock and Stewart have brought their tort claims based on the 
false and fraudulent promises by the TLC Defendants that if the Plaintiffs paid their money 
they would receive money and property in return. These promises were unrelated to religious 
efforts, doctrine or practices. 
Defendants' reliance on State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988) is also 
misplaced. The cited language (Appellants' Brief, p. 13) as to whether men "may believe 
what they cannot prove...." is not relevant when a defendant's behavior in conformance to 
his beliefs violates state law. See Employment Div. Dept of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 879, 110 S. Ct.1595 (1990) (The right of free exercise does not relieve an individual 
of the obligation to comply with a "valid and neutral law of general applicability on the 
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
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proscribes)"). See also State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, f 28 (Holding Utah's bigamy statutes 
are neutral on their face and as applied). 
Defendants have not discussed the most pertinent authority. The Utah Supreme Court 
considered a dispute over the occupancy of land between individuals and the religious 
movement called the Priesthood Work ("The Work") in Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 
1998). Adherents to The Work commonly bought land in the area of Hildale, Utah, and 
Colorado City, Arizona, and deeded it ("consecrated" it) to The Work. Id. at 1252. The land 
was held by a trust known as the United Effort Plan, or "UEP." 
From its inception, the UEP invited members to build their homes on assigned 
lots on UEP land. Through this system, the UEP intended to localize control 
over all local real property and to have the religious leaders manage it. 
Members who built on the trust land were aware that they could not sell or 
mortgage the land and that they would forfeit their improvements if they left 
the land. However, the UEP did encourage its members to improve the lots 
assigned to them and represented to its members that they could live on the 
land permanently, by using such phrases as 'forever' or 'as long as you 
wanted.' 
Jeffs, at 1239-40. 
When dissension over a doctrinal issue arose among adherents of The Work, the group 
split into two groups: specifically, Jeffs (who acquired control of the UEP) and the claimants 
(Stubbs). Jeffs declared that all those living on UEP land were tenants at will and filed an 
unlawful detainer and several quiet title actions against some of the claimants. The claimants 
sued to declare their entitlement to their lots and claiming that the UEP had been unjustly 
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enriched by their improvements to the land. The trial court granted claimants relief on their 
unjust enrichment claim, and both parties appealed. Id. 
The UEP argued that the religious context of the dispute prohibited the court from 
applying unjust enrichment principles, because balancing the equities between the UEP and 
claimants would be tantamount to judging the fairness of the UEP's religious practices and 
is therefore prohibited. Id. at 1243. The Supreme Court stated: 
. . . [Cjourts have broad authority to grant equitable relief as needed. And 
nothing in the general rules of equity applicable in both states prohibits a court 
from deciding an equity case because the parties are religious entities. The 
UEP has cited no Arizona or Utah law suggesting that a court should limit the 
application of the doctrine of unjust enrichment solely because of the religious 
nature of the relationship and motivation of the UEP and claimants. And 
federal constitutional law imposes no such limitation. 
Jeffs, at 1243. 
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, in Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.440, 449 (1969), the First 
Amendment "commands civil courts to decide church property disputes without resolving 
underlying controversies over religious doctrine." Applying this mandate, the Utah Court 
further concluded that "nothing prevents a civil court from hearing an ordinary equity case 
between religious entities or factions, or between a religious entity and a private litigant." 
J ^ , 9 7 0 P . 2 d a t l 2 4 4 . 
Accordingly, this Court should deny Defendants' appeal. The trial court has the 
jurisdiction and duty to determine Plaintiffs' claims against the TLC Defendants, not just for 
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contract breach and unjust enrichment, but also for fraud and misrepresentation and unlawful 
activity i iiorc is not any question of any chui ch docti Iiie c •  = iiti al to Plaintiffs5 claims. 
Essential:}. u h-.i - * " * determined is (i) whether the TLC Defendants made promises to 
Plaintiffs; (ii) whether those promises were knowingly false when made and were intended 
to cause Plaintiffs to act; (in; uh.i,,.; /lamtiffs acted in reliance thereon b> piov idmg the 
cv .',-i-i. * . w ••. .<. . '•.tti ^ - T! ( Defendants performed their promised 
obligation, or (v) whether Plaintiffs conferred upon the Defendants a benefit that it would 
be unjust for them to retain. 
Aiij uuicatioiA oi All of Plaintiffs9 Claims for Fraud, Misrepresentation, Unlawful 
Activity and Breach of Contract Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment, 
In Jeffs
 9 the trial court found that the Jeffs claimants improved the disputed land in 
reiiarv; » K • .. f c j i r e s c i i t n l i o i ^ *'i i( (iiL"\ i-nyiM i i ( li{> l^ nd t".ii-|1i.« r< |^ of their 
lives, conferring a benefit on the UEP which would be inequitable for UEP to retain. Id. at 
1248. The UEP argued on appeal that the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment violated 
both;:i, «..Liii: L un-i . . .. • :' ^ T i i s-;iu . . : n 
"because the ruling burdens the free exercise of its members' religious beliefs. Specifically, 
the UEP asserted that the ruling was unconstitutional because it measured "religious 
expression against ^ - * -.r :: s ! a in^ 
Under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, a court's determination that 
incidentally burdens the exercise of religion is not unconstitutional so long as the law is not 
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intended to burden free exercise, is of general applicability, and is otherwise valid. Id, at 
1249. The relevant interest was articulated by the appellate court: 
We conclude that the state's interest here revolves around the judicial system, 
not the specific results of the judicial action. This is because the UEP 
contends that no remedy could be returned by the trial court on these claims 
without violating the state constitution. The state has a compelling interest in 
ensuring that all parties are able to resolve legal disputes before a neutral 
tribunal. 
Jeffs, at 1250. 
This fundamental right of access to the courts and the remedies of Utah's Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity Act was denied Plaintiffs when their claims for fraud and 
misrepresentation were dismissed and leave to amend was denied. Even if making access 
to the court available to Plaintiffs incidentally burdens the Defendants' exercise of their 
religion, it is not unconstitutional because the state has a compelling interest in judicial 
resolutions of the claims of both parties. Ecclesiastical status does not place the TLC 
association or its agents beyond the law; thus, the court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' fraud and 
misrepresentation and unlawful activity claims, and refusal to allow Plaintiffs leave to amend 
their complaint against Defendants were an abuse of the court's discretion. The First 
Amendment simply does not apply to this case - neither the Establishment Clause nor the 
Free Exercise Clause. All of Plaintiffs' claims should be reinstated for trial, in the event the 
prior verdict is not restored. 
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POINT III 
The Trial Court Properly Denied Defendants9 Rule 
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Claims for 
Breach of Contract and Unjust Enrichment. 
When a motion under 12(b)(6) is filed, the issue before the court is whether the 
petitioner has alleged enough in the complaint to state a cause of action. I his preliminary 
v. Galatka, 933 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1997). Rule 12(b)(6) concerns the sufficiency of the 
pleadings, not the underlying merits of a particular case. 
Iin determining whethei ,\ .:. i I: propei 1) gi ante i a moti :)ii tc dismiss, the 
appellate court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true and considers all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
Whipple v. American J ;: orkl rrigation LJ . , W: : .2d 1 218 ( [ Jta . -vi-. ; tit: ial c oui t and 
IX-fen-hint^  h-^ ^ f;n •.-] • * j >r this basic principle to the Plaintiffs' allegations. 
1L Plaintiffs9 Allegations of Defendants' Promises Are Sufficiently Definite. 
To properly state a cause of action for breach o; contract, a plaintiff must pleau 
the exi^-n-.. ."•>?., \/•- ••'••'" . 1 '• r •: * : 2) performance by the plaintiff, (3) breach 
of the express promise by the defendant, and (4) damages to the plaintiff resulting from the 
breach. Bennett v. Jon?* - .«..,•• Holbrook & McDonough . 7. 
Plainti*T<* ^eco- * -IKO^M Complaint (Add. E) alleges, in paragraph 9, that in exchange 
for money, goods, and services to be given by Hancock to the Defendants and the TLC, they 
promised to give her property and support. Paragraph 10 (Add. L> a lieges that Stewart 
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liquidated her entire retirement savings and turned all the funds over to Defendant Harmston 
for the use of the TLC in exchange for TLC's promise, in paragraph 20, that the TLC would 
always take care of her and, in paragraphs, would repay her and pay any tax liability she 
would incur for early withdrawal of her retirement funds. Neither Plaintiff received any 
money, land, or support from any Defendant, as they promised. Both Plaintiffs suffered 
financial loss as a result of these false promises. 
The trial court reviewed the contract and unjust enrichment allegations of the Second 
Amended Complaint and found that they stated a claim for relief. (R. 1254, Add. F). The 
trial court's ruling should be affirmed as to that issue raised by Appellant. 
B. Defendants' Promises are Not Illusory, 
Defendants do not argue that they made no promises to Plaintiffs. However, they say, 
the promises they made were so conditional and indefinite as to be illusory. In Silvers v. 
Silvers, 999 P.2d 786 (Alaska 2000), Michael Silvers borrowed money from his mother over 
a period of eight years and repaid only a portion. When judgment was entered against him 
in favor of his mother, Michael appealed, arguing that the loan contract failed for 
indefiniteness because a specific time of repayment was absent. The appellate court 
concluded: "A pledge to repay money when the borrower becomes financially able merely 
represents a conditional promise and is legally enforceable upon satisfaction of the condition. 
Such contracts do not fail for indefiniteness." Id. at 790-91. 
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Defendants claim their promises to provide Plaintiffs with money, land, and support 
were conditioned upon "cleansing : >-. * -^4^ . ) This alio : .; >» - deputed by 
Plaintiffs and, as such, is subject to determination by a fact-trier. Those issues were 
addressed in the earlier trial herein, and resolved against Defendants. Defendants are entitled 
to raise the defense as a factual issue, m„ ^\c\ ..ic not .•• - n.i-, . • ••* • ^ueas 
a matter of law. 
C. The Statute of Frauds Does Not Bar Enforcement of Either Promise. 
Whether an agreement is void because it is w urn:: ::i, -_u.i . •• . . i.o • .* A ^^-su* ^ n 
p»"^ ' ^ ^ - ? r ^ ' > Clearfield State Bank, 426 P.2d 227 (Utah 1967). 
Plaintiff Hancock does not allege that any interest in a particular parcel of real 
property was created, granted or assigned to her by the Defendants, i nc 5 eeond Amended 
Conip'.i -it. paraLir.i;" .: • r d;o sold her ranch in 
Indianola, Utah, and gave the proceeds to TLC, she would, in return, receive from the TLC 
a place where she could continue to raise her animals. (Add. i . p. 4. , .%w w.dim is made that 
HatiakI uuiild liine u,in estate en interest in leal pn.peih1* lli.il nmili) be siibjeel In I 't.ih 
Code Ann. § 25-5-1. Instead, TLC promised that farm land and water would be made 
available to her to raise her animals. (R. 200,210,41 ^ K Mich a promise is outside the statute 
O f f ! . H i ; . . •... . H 1>,: • ' " •'.- " ^ f7 " * \M'^'C V ) ' " V " -
Defendants' Appeal Brief, p. 14, admits: "Furthermore, there is no specific property 
described or piece of real property identified to be enforceable. Fhus, the statute of 
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frauds does not apply to bar enforcement of this promise. Moreover, the statute would not 
apply to a constructive trust imposed to prevent Defendants' unjust enrichment at Ms. 
Hancock's expense. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-2; Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 
(Utah 1977). 
The Statute of Frauds does not bar the claims of Co-Plaintiff Stewart, either. Stewart 
alleges that she was promised money and support; specifically, that the "TLC would always 
take care of her." (Add. A, | 20). Her claim for relief, however, is not for a lifetime of 
support, but for the exact amount of money she realized from her retirement account and 
gave to the TLC, $15,766.00, including interest and income tax penalties. Even had she 
made a claim of support for life, such a claim would not be barred by the statute of frauds, 
where it has long been held that such a promise could be performed within one year, should 
Stewart's death occur in that time period. Johnson v. Johnson, 88 Pac. 230 (Utah 1906); 
Pasquin v. Pasquin, 1999 UT App. 245, 988 P.2d 1. 
Defendants also argue that the Fraud Statute bars any judgment against the individual 
defendants because no agreement in writing exists wherein the individuals agreed to answer 
for the debt of the TLC. This argument is far afield. Plaintiffs have never alleged such an 
agreement between the individuals; the liability of the TLC and of the individuals is alleged 
to arise from the concerted and conspiratorial fraudulent conduct of each of the Defendants. 
Essentially, the defenses raised by Defendants are affirmative defenses that are fact-
dependent. These issues of fact require deference to the determination of the trier of fact as 
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to the nature and terms of the promises and commitments made by Defendants, severally and 
in concert. 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint States a Claim For Unjust Enrichment. 
According to Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998), "[a] party may prevail on 
an unjust enrichment theory o> \;io. .:u inice KMIVH. . 
{Lj & benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) an 
appreciation or knowledge by the conferree of the benefit; and 
(3) the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit 
under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the 
conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value.'" 
[(i ,t p , : v . ^ ,ino;: ... tnnnican Towers Owners Assoc, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical^ 930 P2d 
1192 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). 
The trial court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss this cause u i u. 11 u w.} LX ognizing 
that tin1 ''uvnncl Amewln.l I 'nmphnnt i t l ln^ these three elements sufficiently;paragraph25 
states that Defendants have acquired about $250,000.00 of money, services, or property from 
Hancock, and $ 15,766.00 from Stewart; paragraph 26, that Defendants breached an implied 
contract Willi Plainlill"; h\ rvlnsiny I." prn\ Hr \hv pivmiM"! return consideration; and, 
paragraph 27, that Plaintiffs have been damaged and Defendants unjustly enriched thereby. 
(Add. F, pp. 4-6.) Defendants appeal the trial court's ruling on the weak assertion that there 
caiinn1 '".' IMIIJI .MI cxpivs.s ji)il '>n unpln-il contract with the same terms. ' : .:• . 
The trial court's refusal to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims of breach of contract and 
unjust enrichment should be affirmed. 
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POINT IV 
The Trial Court Erred When it Determined 
That Douglas Jordan Is An Indispensable Party to this Action. 
The trial court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend in 2003 on the grounds 
of untimeliness, requiring adjudication of church doctrine, and lack of a non-party, Douglas 
Jordan. (R. 1511, Add. G). The trial court improperly denied the Plaintiffs leave to amend 
their Complaint, stating, inter alia, that relief could not be afforded Plaintiffs without joining 
Mr. Douglas Jordan as a party. Douglas Jordan is Plaintiff Hancock's former husband and 
is now deceased. His deposition was published but is not in the court's record {see R. 766). 
His trial testimony appears in R. 1575. 
Defendants did not raise the indispensable party claim in their third motion to dismiss 
(R. 1069, dated 3-14-03). The issue was raised only in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for 
leave to file a third amended complaint (R. 1424, p.8), after the court dismissed counts 2, 4 
and 5 of the Second Amended Complaint. (Add. F.) 
Defendants have never articulated any reason on which they propose that Jordan is 
"indispensable" to these proceedings under Rule 19, Utah R. Civil P. In their 9-29-03 
Memorandum (R. 1424), Defendants discuss Jordan's alleged role in how the TLC obtained 
Ms. Hancock's money. Defendants have alleged that Hancock gave the proceeds of the sale 
of her ranch to her husband, Jordan; that she knew of the monies being donated and the 
donations were of her own free will and choice; and, that Hancock's claim for return of the 
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money should be against her husband, Jordan, not Defendants. There are only factual 
assertions, resolved against ueicnuuhi.- a,
 i:^ 
No legal authority is given by Defendants in support of their claim, nor is there even 
citation to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 17 or 1(; on "real property in interest" or on 
"indispensable parties." 1 ^ :;;«. court erred by ruling as a :::.: .e. ; . ^ a 
; • r\ \ • --^cte relief could not be afforded, and in denying Plaintiffs leave 
to amend their complaint (which did not join Jordan). (R. 15V. \dd. u) . 
On appeal, the Defendants have again devoted only twelve (i i) i mes to their argument 
that Jordan is an indispensable par ty to the Plaintiffs' remaining causes of action before the 
trial court. The Defendants' appeal argument, without citation to any authority or rule of 
procedure, is only a conclusory factual allegation that the proceeds of the sale of Hancock's 
ranch \ v sre not hei premarital funds L • i r. . w .\ ;s lie desired; that 
Hancock waived any claim to the proceeds when she stipulated to a decree of divorce that 
did not award those funds to her; and, that Jordan is the real party in interest, and, as such, 
v. Green, 2004 UT 76, at *, _ . 
Under Grand County v, Rogers, 2002 UT 25, % 2<\ 44 , •. J J J-+. me moving party 
b e a r > J , . i'U .. *: ;*- • r v i i . " . \\ ^ - . K c i f V f:*r- ;•*••* * ^ > , . ; ; , ;• M \ I : i , i , I -
parties are necessary, un certiorari, the Supreme Court discussed the two-part analysis 
required for a determination of indispensability under Rule 19(a): 
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Under rule 19, the trial court must first determine whether a party is necessary. 
.. If the party is necessary, the court must next consider whether joinder of the 
necessary party is feasible... If so, the necessary party "shall be joined." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 19(a)... If, on the other hand, the court finds it unfeasible to join the 
necessary party, the court must address the indispensability of the party under 
Rule 19(b) and decide whether the action should proceed or be dismissed. . . 
.Further, in performing a rule 19 analysis, a court must discuss specific facts 
and reasoning that lead to the conclusion that a party is or is not necessary or 
indispensable, and failure to do so is error. (Citations omitted). 
Grand County, 44 P.3d at 740-41. The trial court did not make any such analysis. The 
Grand County court's criticisms or that appellant's lack of authority and showing equall) 
applies in this case. Id. 
The present appeal requires the same step-by-step analysis of whether Jordan is ar 
indispensable party without whom the matter cannot proceed. Nevertheless, Defendants dc 
not present the specific facts and reasoning under Rule 19, nor do they cite any authority tc 
the trial court or this court. Defendants' failure below caused the trial court to err when i 
determined that Jordan was a party without whom complete relief could not be afforded. 
The trial court further abused its discretion by refusing to allow an amendment of the 
Plaintiffs' complaint. The refusal constituted a dismissal with prejudice. In Bonneville Towei 
Condominium Management Committee v. Thompson-Michie Associates, Inc., 728 P.2d 1011 
(Utah 1986) (per curiam), the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice for plaintiff* 
failure to comply with Rule 19(a). The Utah Supreme Court found abuse of discretion: 
. . . Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), a dismissal for failure to 
comply with Rule 19(a) is not an adjudication on the merits. Not having 
considered the merits of plaintiff s claims, there was no reason for the court 
to dismiss with prejudice and prevent future consideration of the claims should 
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the defect be corrected. The trial court abused its discretion by entering its 
Rule 41(b) dismissal with prejudice. 
Bonnie n ;• ' .•••. ' ! *\V' * ir .j'n ! • . r' \f-r;\ :i:c l-\ . IJICS 
v. Micro-Dex Corporation, 739 P.2d 1131,1133 (Utah App. 1987) (the trial court abused its 
discretion in not allowing an amendment just because of increased costs and complexity). 
. tiie present case, Plaintiffs > ei e denied the oppc i tunit> I: : file an amended 
com plant, essentially a dismissal, with prejudice, of their fraud, misrepresentation and 
unlawful activity claims. As in Bonneville Tower and Intermountain Physicians, the court 
abused its discretion when it did not a.n/A the amendment. 
!
 ^ -* I f Defendants believed he was "indispensable," Defendants could have 
joined Jordan (or his estate) as a party to the action at any time. Having failed to join Jordan 
or his estate to the action, defendants should not now complain that the court's failure to 
recur7'" -vruVr <^ ' '• " i .in 'i.'i'iittV iii-niii:, ^ "!,(^ <>f t.-*. »r. *v i -, i ;i -s «1 • i^^ ij^ .^tl \.ihr 
prejudice. SeeLandes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127,1132 (Utah 1990) (Having failed 
to join the SB A, plaintiff cannot complain that the court's failure to require joinder ofthe 
S B A i> : v\ JiMOU. V ; 
Defendants' appeal from the trial court's refusal to dismiss the existing causes of 
action should be denied. As to the trial court's denial, of leave to amend as to the dismissed 
counts on iraud, misrepresentation and unlawful ndn \\\ Phiiild h should \v,\\ HKVII liidiited 
leave to amend their complaint on remand. That ruling should be dismissed. 
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POINT V 
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion When it Denied 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Their Complaint as Untimely, 
Plaintiffs' motion to amend its Second Amended Complaint was not untimely when 
the trial court reversed its prior decisions denying Defendants' prior motions and had already 
set aside the jury verdict for Plaintiffs. Defendants had twice before moved to dismiss 
Plaintiffs' claims, and the trial court had denied those motions. All issues were tried to the 
jury in January 2002. The verdict and Judgment were entered. Plaintiffs were totally 
surprised by the trial court's reversal in 2003 of all its prior rulings that the Plaintiffs' 
allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, racketeering and infliction of emotional harm 
sufficiently stated claims. The trial court's belated dismissal of those claims and then 
refusing Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend as "untimely" was a clear abuse of discretion. 
The opposing parties were not put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue 
adjudicated for which he had not had time to prepare. Bekins Bar VRanch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 
455,464 (Utah 1983). In this case, no new factual or legal claims were raised since the filing 
of the complaint in 1998 and the jury trial in 2002. Under Plaintiffs' proposed amendment, 
Defendants would be preparing the same defenses as at the prior trial. Any untimely action 
was that of the trial court in dismissing the claims only weeks before trial after previously 
denying the same motions on prior occasions. 
If the jury verdict is not reinstated, then the trial court should be directed, on remand, 
to allow Plaintiffs to amend their complaint. 
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POINT VI 
The Second Amended Complaint Sufficiently Alleges the 
Specific Acts of Defendants9 Fraud, Constructive Fraud or Negligent 
Misrepresentation and Violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1601, etseq. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated, in Whipple v, American Fork Irrigation Co,, 910 P.2d 
1218, (Utah 1996): "In determining whether the trial court properly granted a motion to 
ci:str.;^ :,. ,it>pe-L - : .' . . . ;* :•• • !;..-:t i ... .\*-. :• ;\;i ; .. ••.., and 
consider all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to 
the plaintiff." The propriety of a motion to dismiss is a question of law which is reviewed for 
28 at If 2,20P.3d895. 
A. Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is Sufficient to State Plaintiffs Claims 
Under Utah R. of Civil P. 9(b). 
'I he trial coui ill: :i: i lie d be lc v > that Plaintiffs failed to plead Defendants' fraud and theft 
with sufficient particularity under Rule 9(b), and granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, 
stating that Plaintiffs alleged only general legal conclusions not supported by facts that 
]dciiiu\ ; u:' [-aihv : . ^ . p . . > ,u^ . - ' ; . . . !c. ' : :u.:\\ v\ ere ^pokci- " The 
causes of action for fraud/constructive fraud/negligent misrepresentation were dismissed. 
This ruling was made in blatant disregard of the specific instances of promises and 
210, 418) and Stewart (R. 217), and witness Douglas Jordan (R. 200), and the substantial 
corroborating testimony already presented at trial. 
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For instance, the Second Amended Complaint, (Add. E) avers that: 
(1) promises were made to Hancock by many of the Defendants, including 
Harmston, acting in his own person and as a agent of the TLC, that if Hancock sold 
her ranch in Indianola, Utah and gave the funds to the TLC, she would receive in 
return real property where she could continue to raise her animals flffi 9,18); promises 
were made to Stewart by Harmston, acting in his own person and as an agent of the 
TLC, that if she liquidated her IRA account and gave the monies from the account to 
him, he would repay her and pay any tax liability she would incur for early withdrawal 
(1Tfl9,20); 
(2) the promises were false statements because Harmston and the TLC had a 
pecuniary interest in the transaction, had control over whether or not the promise was 
fulfilled, and had a confidential or superior relationship with the promisees (^16,17, 
and 23); 
(3) the Plaintiffs turned over their property and means to Harmston and/or the 
TLC and suffered the loss of nearly all their assets (f 21(ix)); 
(4) the false statements of Harmston, individually, and Harmston as agent of 
the TLC, and other of the Defendants were intentional and were made regarding 
future events within Defendants' control (fflf 22, 23); 
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(5) the Defendants gained a superior position of confidence with the Plaintiffs 
and took unfair advantage of that position by persuading the Plaintiffs that they must 
turn over their wealth to the Defendants (If 17); 
(6) the Plaintiffs met with the agents of the TLC, listened to their promises, 
and had no reason to believe that the promises of future performance were false (]fl[ 
8,9,16-20); 
(7) the Plaintiffs were persuaded that they must turn over their wealth to the 
Defendants and that they would receive land and support in return (ffl[9, 19-20); 
(8) The Plaintiffs reasonably relied on Defendants' promises of future 
performance flflf 21(viii), 23); and, 
(9) the Plaintiffs turned over their property and means to Harmston and/or the 
TLC, never received the land and support they were promised, and consequently 
suffered the loss of nearly all their assets (fl 21(ix), 10-12, 14). 
In addition to these allegations of the Second Amended Complaint, Defendants, and 
the court, had the benefit of a full presentation of Plaintiffs' testimony and their supporting 
evidence at the trial of the matter on January 22-25, 2002, when the jury rendered its verdict 
for Plaintiffs. At that time, nineteen (19) exhibits were received into evidence and fifteen 
(15) witnesses testified. (Minutes, R. 832-4.) Based upon on the evidence presented, the 
jury was able to return a verdict for Plaintiffs on the causes of action for breach and fraud. 
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For Defendants to argue, and the trial court to conclude, that the allegations of fraud in the 
Second Amended Complaint f^ f 1 through 9 were inadequately pleaded is beyond rationality. 
The allegations Plaintiffs have made give sufficient and fair notice to each of the 
Defendants of Plaintiff s claims against each of them, jointly and severally. Williams v. State 
Farm Ins. Co., 656 P. 2d 966,971 (Utah 1982); accord, Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation 
Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1221-22 (Utah 1996). 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint contains a great deal more than just the "broad 
and general statements" that have been held to give insufficient notice to a defendant. The 
content, nature and substance of Defendants' false statement are detailed. See Chapman v. 
Primary Children's Hospital, 784 P. 2d 1181,1186 (Utah 1989) (holding that allegations that 
defendants withheld information regarding the cause and stating how the defendants had 
"misinformed" the plaintiffs of the injury contained the relevant surrounding facts describing 
plaintiffs' claim); Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377P. 2d 189,190 (Utah 1962) (stating 
that a complaint should allege the content, nature or substance of alleged false statements). 
Plaintiffs have pleaded the factual content and the substance of their claims and of the 
Defendants' conduct, not just "bare legal conclusions." Plaintiffs established then with 
admitted evidence. The allegations are more than adequate to state Plaintiffs' claims for 
relief and give fair notice to each Defendant. 
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B. Plaintiffs9 Second Amended Complaint is Sufficient to State Plaintiffs9 Claims 
Under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activities Statutes. 
The Plaintiffs must plead with particularity their claims under the Utah Pattern of 
Unlawful Activities Act in order to give sufficient and fair notice to each Defendant. The 
trial court's error in dismissing Plaintiffs' pattern of unlawful activity claim begins with an 
analysis of the relevant statutory provisions. Aha Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 
1287 (Utah 1993). 
Section 76-10-1605(1), Utah Code Ann., provides that a person injured by an entity 
engaged in conduct forbidden by any provision of § 76-10-1603 may sue and recover twice 
the damages sustained. Section 76-10-1603 defines unlawful acts and provides, in subsection 
76-10-1603(3), that it is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any 
enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that 
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity. Subsection 76-1-1602(2) defines 
"enterprise" as "any individual . . . association, or other legal entity, and any group of 
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. . . ." Subsection 76-10-1602(3) 
defines "pattern of unlawful activity" to mean "at least three episodes of unlawful activity, 
which episodes are not isolated, but have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, 
victims, or methods of commission . .. ." Finally, "unlawful activity" is defined in section 
76-10-1602 as "to directly engage in conduct or . . . intentionally aid another person to 
engage in conduct which would constitute" one of the enumerated crimes. Subsection 76-
10-1605(1 )(b) provides that civil liability may attach regardless of whether "the conduct has 
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been adjudged criminal by any court of the state or of the United States," and the burden of 
proof is "clear and convincing evidence." Subsection 76-10-1605(5). 
In the present case, Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, paragraph 30, (Add. E) 
alleges that the Defendant TLC was the "enterprise" and individual "Defendants affiliated 
with the TLC have committed at least three acts in violation of the 'Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act.'" Paragraphs 7 through 14 allege the elements of two instances of theft by 
deception:4 Defendants obtained money from Hancock and from Stewart by deception. A 
third episode is alleged in paragraphs 9 and 11, which allege theft of services:5 Hancock was 
promised property and support in "exchange for . . . services to be given by the Plaintiff, 
Kaziah May Hancock," and that "Kaziah May Hancock did deliver . . . services to the 
Defendants after this time and continued to do so until. . . Ms. Hancock was asked to leave 
in or about August 1997." 
The Second Amended Complaint sufficiently described the factual basis of the 
racketeering claim, enabling Defendants to prepare an adequate defense. See State v. Bell, 
770 P. 2d 100 (Utah 1988). At this point in the proceedings, the trial court should have 
accepted as true the factual allegations in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and, 
4Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405. Theft by deception. (1) A person commits theft if 
he obtains or exercises control over the property of another by deception and with a 
purpose to deprive him thereof. 
5Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-409. Theft of Services. (1) A person commits theft if he 
obtains services which he knows are available only for compensation by deception, threat, 
force, or any other means designed to avoid the due payment for them. 
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Plaintiffs argue, denied the motion to dismiss this claim. A cognizable claim for relief has 
been stated. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's setting aside the jury's verdict was unsupported, an abuse of 
discretion and error of law. The jury's verdict and the judgment thereon should be reinstated. 
In the alternative, the trial court's belated decision, barely two months before trial, dismissing 
the fraud, misrepresentation and racketeering claims, and refusing leave to amend was an 
abuse of discretion and should be reversed. The dismissed causes of action should be 
reinstated. If a retrial is necessary, trial should be inclusive of all Plaintiffs' claims for relief. 
If a further amendment of Plaintiffs' complaint is required, Plaintiffs should be allowed to 
further amend so that trial can proceed on all counts. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _%_ day of September, 2004. 
Clark R/Nielsen 
Attorney for Appellees 
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Tab A 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religions and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 




As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person immune from suit 
as defined in Subsection (3), who is claimed to be liable because of fault to 
any person seeking recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission 
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a 
person seeking recovery, including negligence in all its degrees, compara-
tive negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or 
implied warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification, 
or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person immune from suit" means: 
(a) an employer immune from suit under Title 34A, Chapter 3, 
Workers' Compensation Act, or Chapter 3a, Utah Occupational Dis-
ease Act; and 
(b) a governmental entity or governmental employee immune from 
suit pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 30, Governmental Immunity Act. 
(4) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or 
reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is 
authorized to act as legal representative. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-37, enacted by L. which: (1) retrospective operation does not en-
1986, ch. 199, § 1; 1994, ch. 221, § 2; 1996, large, eliminate, or destroy a vested right; and 
cli. 240, § 374; 1999, ch. 95, § 1. (2) a final unappealable judgment or order has 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend- not been issued as of the effective date [May 3, 
ment, effective May 3,1999, substituted "com- 1999], by: (a) the United States Supreme Court; 
parative" for "contributory" in Subsection (2) (b) the Utah Supreme Court; (c) the Utah Court 
and corrected a reference. of Appeals; (d) the United States Circuit Court 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1999, of Appeals; (e) the United States District Court; 
ch. 95, § 6 makes the 1999 amendment retro-
 o r (f) the Utah district court/' 
spective to March 3, 1998, "for any actions for 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS ligent and intentional conduct. Field v. Boyer 
Co., 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998). 
Fault. 
Cited. Cited in Cortez v. University Mall Shopping 
Ctr., 941 F. Supp. 1096 (D. Utah 1996). 
Fault, 
The definition of fault encompasses both neg-
78-27-38. Comparative negligence. 
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by 
that person. 
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from any defendant or group of 
defendants whose fault, combined with the fault of persons immune from suit, 
exceeds the fault of the person seeking recovery prior to any reallocation of 
fault made under Subsection 78-27-39(2). 
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in 
excess of the proportion of fault attributed to that defendant under Section 
78-27-39. 
(4) (a) In determining the proportionate fault attributable to each defen-
dant, the fact finder may, and when requested by a party shall, consider 
the conduct of any person who contributed to the alleged injury regardless 
of whether the person is a person immune from suit or a defendant in the 
action and may allocate fault to each person seeking recovery, to each 
defendant, and to any other person whether joined as a party to the action 
or not and whose identity is known or unknown to the parties to the action, 
including a person immune from suit who contributed to the alleged 
injury. In the case of a motor vehicle accident involving an unidentified 
motor vehicle, the existence of the vehicle shall be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence which may consist solely of one person's testimony. 
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune from suit is considered only 
to accurately determine the fault of the person seeking recovery and a 
defendant and may not subject the person immune from suit to any 
liability, based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action. 
History: C. 1953, 78-27-38, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 199, § 2; 1994, ch. 221, § 3; 1999, 
ch. 95, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend-
ment, effective May 3, 1999, in Subsection 
(4)(a) added the language beginning "other per-
son" and ending "to the action, including a" 
near the end of the first sentence and added the 
second sentence. 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1999, 
ch. 95, § 6 makes the 1999 amendment retro-
spective to March 3, 1998, "for any actions for 
which: (1) retrospective operation does not en-
large, eliminate, or destroy a vested right; and 
(2) a final unappealable judgment or order has 
not been issued as of the effective date [May 3, 
1999], by: (a) the United States Supreme Court; 
(b) the Utah Supreme Court; (c) the Utah Court 
of Appeals; (d) the United States Circuit Court 
of Appeals; (e) the United States District Court; 
or (f) the Utah district court." 
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Rule 9. Pleading special matters. 
(a)(1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative 
capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party. A party may raise an issue as to the legal existence of 
any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity by specific negative 
averment, which shall include facts within the pleader's knowledge. If raised as an issue, the party relying on such capacity, authority, or legal 
existence, shall establish the same on the trial. 
(a)(2) Designation of unknown defendant. When a party does not know the name of an adverse party, he may state that fact in the pleadings, and 
thereupon such adverse party may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name; provided, that when the true name of such adverse 
party is ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly. 
(a)(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of unknown parties. In an action to quiet title wherein any of the parties are designated in the 
caption as "unknown," the pleadings may describe such unknown persons as "all other persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or interest 
in, or lien upon the real property described in the pleading adverse to the complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto." 
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally. 
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions 
precedent have been performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity, and when 
so made the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on the trial establish the facts showing such performance or occurrence. 
(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or act it is sufficient to aver that the document was issued or the act done in compliance 
with law. 
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is 
sufficient to aver the judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it. A denial of jurisdiction shall be made 
specifically and with particularity and when so made the party pleading the judgment or decision shall establish on the trial all controverted 
jurisdictional facts. 
(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, averments of time and place are material and shall be considered like all 
other averments of material matter. 
(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically stated. 
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to state the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged 
generally that the cause of action is barred by the provisions of the statute relied on, referring to or describing such statute specifically and definitely 
by section number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designating the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such 
allegation is controverted, the party pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing that the cause of action is so barred. 
(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state, or an ordinance of any political subdivision thereof, or a right derived from 
such statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to such statute or ordinance by its title and the day of its passage or by its section number or other 
designation in any official publication of the statutes or ordinances. The court shall thereupon take judicial notice thereof. 
(j) Libel and slander. 
G)(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary in an action for libel or slander to set forth any intrinsic facts showing the application to the 
plaintiff of the defamatory matter out of which the action arose; but it is sufficient to state generally that the same was published or spoken 
concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the party alleging such defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, that it was so 
published or spoken. 
(j)(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander, the defendant may allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory 
and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, and, whether he proves the justification or not, he may give in evidence the 
mitigating circumstances. 
(k) Renew judgment. A complaint alleging failure to pay a judgment shall describe the judgment with particularity or attach a copy of the judgment to 
the complaint. 
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Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the 
service of the summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days after service of the summons and complaint is complete 
outside the state. A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff 
shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty 
days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of time as follows, 
unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the time for 
responding to the remaining claims: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after 
notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more 
definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made 
by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) 
insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion 
making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with 
one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a 
pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the 
trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as 
one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for 
judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the 
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable 
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (1)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and 
the motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the 
court orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot 
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. 
The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within 
ten days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or 
make such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon 
motion made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense 
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If 
a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by 
motion, the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of 
this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense 
of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a 
legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the 
merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the 
court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence 
that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be 
deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and 
determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties 
as security for payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be required of any officer, 
instrumentality, or agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, 
upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
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Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant. 
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, 
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute 
may sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use 
or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or 
joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been 
commenced in the name of the real party in interest. 
(b) Minors or incompetent persons. A minor or an insane or incompetent person who is a party must appear either by a general guardian or by a 
guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by the court in which the action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed in any case 
when it is deemed by the court in which the action or proceeding is prosecuted expedient to represent the minor, insane or incompetent person in the 
action or proceeding, notwithstanding that the person may have a general guardian and may have appeared by the guardian. In an action in rem it 
shall not be necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for any unknown party who might be a minor or an incompetent person. 
(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. A guardian ad litem appointed by a court must be appointed as follows: 
(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the minor, if the minor is of the age of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the application 
of a relative or friend of the minor. 
(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application of the minor if the minor is of the age of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after the 
service of the summons, or if under that age or if the minor neglects so to apply, then upon the application of a relative or friend of the minor, or of 
any other party to the action. 
(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon motion therefor, shall be entitled to an order designating some suitable 
person to be guardian ad litem for the minor defendant, unless the defendant or someone in behalf of the defendant within 20 days after service of 
notice of such motion shall cause to be appointed a guardian for such minor. Service of such notice may be made upon the defendant's general or 
testamentary guardian located in the defendant's state; if there is none, such notice, together with the summons in the action, shall be served in the 
manner provided for publication of summons upon such minor, if over fourteen years of age, or, if under fourteen years of age, by such service on 
the person with whom the minor resides. The guardian ad litem for such nonresident minor defendant shall have 20 days after appointment in which 
to plead to the action. 
(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or proceeding, upon the application of a relative or friend of such insane or 
incompetent person, or of any other party to the action or proceeding. 
(d) Associates may sue or be sued by common name. When two or more persons associated in any business either as a joint-stock company, a 
partnership or other association, not a corporation, transact such business under a common name, whether it comprises the names of such 
associates or not, they may sue or be sued by such common name. Any judgment obtained against the association shall bind the joint property of all 
the associates in the same manner as if all had been named parties and had been sued upon their joint liability. The separate property of an 
individual member of the association may not be bound by the judgment unless the member is named as a party and the court acquires jurisdiction 
over the member. 
(e) Action against a nonresident doing business in this state. When a nonresident person is associated in and conducts business within the state of 
Utah in one or more places in that person's own name or a common trade name, and the business is conducted under the supervision of a manager, 
superintendent or agent the person may be sued in the person's name in any action arising out of the conduct of the business. 
(f) As used in these rules, the term plaintiff shall include a petitioner, and the term defendant shall include a respondent. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Paragraph (d) has been changed to conform to the holding in Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988), which allows an 
unincorporated association to sue in its own name. The rule continues to allow an unincorporated association to be sued in its own name. The final 
sentence of paragraph (d) was added to confirm that the separate property of an individual member of an association may not be bound by the 
judgment unless the member is made a party. 
Technical changes in all paragraphs of the rule make the terminology gender neutral. In part (c) the word "minor" has replaced the word "infant," in 
order to maintain consistency with recent changes made in Rule 4(e)(2). In Rule 4 an infant is defined as a person under the age of 14 years, 
whereas the intent of Rule 17(c) is to include persons under the age of 18 years. 
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Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, 
or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a 
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order 
that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary 
plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person as described in Subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court 
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent 
person being thus regarded as indispensable The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the 
person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the 
shaping of relief, or other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be 
adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as 
described in Subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons why they are not joined. 
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 23. 
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76-10-1511. Cumulative and supplemental nature of 
act. 
The provisions of this act shaft be cumulative and supple-
mental to the provisions of any other law of the state. 1979 
PART 16 
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISES 
76-10-1601. Short title. 
This act is the "Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act." 1987 
76-10-1602. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietor-
ship, partnership, corporation, business trust, associa-
tion, or other legal entity, and any union or group of 
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, 
and includes illicit as well as licit entities. 
(2) "Pattern of unlawful activity" means engaging in 
conduct which constitutes the commission of at least three 
episodes of unlawful activity, which episodes are not 
isolated, but have the same or similar purposes, results, 
participants, victims, or methods of commission, or other-
wise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. 
Taken together, the episodes shall demonstrate continu-
ing unlawful conduct and be related either to each other 
or to the enterprise. At least one of the episodes compris-
ing a pattern of unlawful activity shall have occurred 
after July 31,1981. The most recent act constituting part 
of a pattern of unlawful activity as defined by this part 
shall have occurred within five years of the commission of 
the next preceding act alleged as part of the pattern. 
(3) "Person" includes any individual or entity capable of 
holding a legal or beneficial interest in property, including 
state, county, and local governmental entities. 
(4) "Unlawful activity" means to directly engage in 
conduct or to solicit, request, command, encourage, or 
intentionally aid another person to engage in conduct 
which would constitute any offense described by the 
following crimes or categories of crimes, or to attempt or 
conspire to engage in an act which would constitute any of 
those offenses, regardless of whether the act is in fact 
charged or indicted by any authority or is classified as a 
misdemeanor or a felony: 
(a) assault or aggravated assault, Sections 76-5-
102 and 76-5-103; 
(b) a threat against life or property, Section 76-5-
107; 
(c) criminal homicide, Sections 76-5-201, 76-5-202, 
and 76-5-203; 
(d) kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping, Sections 
76-5-301 and 76-5-302; 
(e) arson or aggravated arson, Sections 76-6-102 
and 76-6-103; 
(f) causing a catastrophe, Section 76-6-105; 
(g) burglary or aggravated burglary, Sections 76-6-
202 and 76-6-203; 
(h) burglary of a vehicle, Section 76-6-204; 
(i) manufacture or possession of an instrument for 
burglary or theft, Section 76-6-205; 
(j) robbery or aggravated robbery, Sections 76-6-
301 and 76-6-302; 
(k) theft, Section 76-6-404; 
(1) theft by deception, Section 76-6-405; 
(m) theft by extortion, Section 76-6-406; 
(n) receiving stolen property, Section 76-6-408; 
(o) theft of services, Section 76-6-409; 
(p) forgery, Section 76-6-501; 
(q) fraudulent use of a credit card, Sections 7(u 
506.1, 76-6-506.2, and 76-6-506.4; ^ 
\x) computer fraud, TVrie 1$, Chapter $, "Part 7« 
(s) bribery or receiving bribe by person in th 
business of selection, appraisal, or criticism of goo^ 
Section 76-6-508; 
(t) bribery of a labor official, Section 76-6-509* 
(u) defrauding creditors, Section 76-6-511; 
(v) acceptance of deposit by insolvent financial 
institution, Section 76-6-512; 
(w) unlawful dealing with property by fiduciary 
Section 76-6-513; 
(x) bribery or threat to influence contest, Section 
76-6-514; 
(y) making a false credit report, Section 76-6-517-
(z) criminal simulation, Section 76-6-518; 
(aa) criminal usury, Section 76-6-520; 
(bb) false or fraudulent insurance claim, Section 
76-6-521; 
(cc) sale of a child, Section 76-7-203; 
(dd) bribery to influence official or political actions, 
Section 76-8-103; 
(ee) threats to influence official or political action 
Section 76-8-104; 
(ff) receiving bribe or bribery by public servant, 
Section 76-8-105; 
(gg) receiving bribe or bribery for endorsement of 
person as public servant, Section 76-8-106; 
{Wx] official mis.cQad.uct, Sections 76-8-2Q1 s M I ^ 
8-202; 
(ii) obstructing justice, Section 76-8-306; 
(jj) acceptance of bribe or bribery to prevent crimi-
nal prosecution, Section 76-8-308; 
(kk) false or inconsistent material statements, 
Section 76-8-502; 
(11) false or inconsistent statements, Section 76-8-
503; 
(mm) written false statements, Section 76-8-504; 
(nn) tampering with a witness, retaliation against 
a witness or informant, or bribery, Section 76-8-508; 
(00) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal pro-
ceeding, Section 76-8-509; 
(pp) tampering with evidence, Section 76-8-510; 
(qq) intentionally or knowingly causing one ani-
mal to fight with another, Subsection 76-9-301(l)(f); 
(rr) delivery to common carrier, mailing, or place-
ment on premises of an incendiary device, Section 
76-10-307; 
(ss) construction or possession of an incendiary 
device, Section 76-10-308; 
(tt) possession of a deadly weapon with intent to 
assault, Section 76-10-507; 
(uu) unlawful marking of pistol or revolver, Sec-
tion 76-10-521; 
(w) alteration of number or mark on pistol or 
revolver, Section 76-10-522; 
(ww) forging or counterfeiting trademarks, trade 
name, or trade device, Section 76-10-1002; 
(xx) selling goods under counterfeited trademark, 
trade name, or trade devices, Section 76-10-1003; 
(yy) sales in containers bearing registered trade-
mark of substituted articles, Section 76-10-1004; 
(zz) selling or dealing with article bearing regis-
tered trademark or service mark with intent to de-
fraud, Section 76-10-1006; 
(aaa) gambling, Section 76-10-1102; 
(bbb) gambling fraud, Section 76-10-1103; 
(ccc) gambling promotion, Section 76-10-1104; 
CRIMINAL CODE 76-10-1603.5 
(ddd) possessing a gambling device or record, Sec-
tion T6-10-110S; 
(eee) confidence game, Section 76-10-1109; 
(fff) distributing pornographic material, Section 
76-10-1204; 
(ggg) inducing acceptance of pornographic mate-
rial, Section 76-10-1205; 
(hhh) dealing in harmful material to a minor, 
Section 76-10-1206; 
(iii) distribution of pornographic films, Section 76-
10-1222; 
(jjj) indecent public displays, Section 76-10-1228; 
(kkk) prostitution, Section 76-10-1302; 
(111) aiding prostitution, Section 76-10-1304; 
(mmm) exploiting prostitution, Section 76-10-
1305; 
(nnn) aggravated exploitation of prostitution, Sec-
tion 76-10-1306; 
(ooo) sexual exploitation of a minor, Section 76-
5a-3; 
(ppp) communications fraud, Section 76-10-1801; 
(qqq) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions 
of Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances 
Act, or Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled 
Substances Act, or Title 58, Chapter 37c, Utah Con-
trolled Substance Precursor Act; 
(rrr) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions 
of Title 61, Chapter 1, Utah Uniform Securities Act; 
(sss) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions 
of Title 57, Chapter 11, Utah Uniform Land Sales 
Practices Act; 
(ttt) false claims for public assistance under Sec-
tion 35A-1-502, 76-8-1203, 76-8-1204, or 76-8-1205; 
(uuu) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions 
of Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah Procurement Code; 
(vw) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions 
of the laws governing taxation in this state; 
(www) any act prohibited by the criminal provi-
sions of Title 32A, Chapter 12, Criminal Offenses; 
(xxx) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions 
of Title 13, Chapter 10, Unauthorized Recording 
Practices Act; 
(yyy) deceptive business practices, Section 76-6-
507; 
(zzz) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions 
of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering 
and Currency Transaction Reporting Act; 
(aaaa) any act illegal under the laws of the United 
States and enumerated in Title 18, Section 1961 
(1KB), (C), and (D) of the United States Code; 
(bbbb) any act prohibited by the criminal provi-
sions of Title 19, Environmental Quality Code, Sec-
tions 19-1-101 through 19-7-109; 
(cccc) taking, destroying, or possessing wildlife or 
parts of wildlife for the primary purpose of sale, 
trade, or other pecuniary gain, in violation of Title 23, 
Chapter 13, or Section 23-20-4; and 
(dddd) false claims for medical benefits, kickbacks, 
and any other act prohibited by False Claims Act, 
Sections 26-20-1 through 26-20-12. 1997 
76;|°-1603, Unlawful acts. 
Pro ^ *s u n ^ a w u i l f°r anY person who has received any 
ceeds derived, whether directly or indirectly, from a pat-
as u °^.un^awful activity in which the person has participated 
0f ^Principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part 




ef from the investment or use of those proceeds, in the 
Uoi U l ^ o n °^ a n v m f c e r e s t in, or the establishment or ope 
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of 
unlawful activity to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, 
any interest in or control of any enterprise. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated 
with any enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly 
or indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's affairs through 
a patt^m
 0 f unlawful activity. 
(4) tt is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any 
provision of Subsection (1), (2), or (3). 1987 
1
 of, any enterprise. 
• opera-
76-10-1605 CRIMINAL CODE 294 
76-10-1605. Remedies of person injured by a pattern of 
unlawful activity — Double damages — Costs, 
including attorney's fee — Arbitration — 
Agency — Burden of proof—Actions by attor-
ney general, county attorney, or district attor-
ney — Dismissal — Statute of l imitations — 
Authorized orders of district court. 
(1) A person injured in his person, business, or property by 
a person engaged in conduct forbidden by any provision of 
Section 76-10-1603 may sue in an appropriate district court 
and recover twice the damages he sustains, regardless of 
whether: 
(a) the injury is separate or distinct from the injury 
suffered as a result of the acts or conduct constituting the 
pattern of unlawful conduct alleged as part of the cause of 
action; or 
(b) the conduct has been adjudged criminal by any 
court of the state or of the United States. 
(2) A party who prevails on a cause of action brought under 
this section recovers the cost of the suit, including a reason-
able attorney's fee. 
(3) All actions arising under this section which are 
grounded in fraud are subject to arbitration under Title 78, 
Chapter 31a. 
(4) In all actions under this section, a principal is liable for 
actual damages for harm caused by an agent acting within the 
scope of either his employment or apparent authority. A 
principal is liable for double damages only if the pattern of 
unlawful activity alleged and proven as part of the cause of 
action was authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, un-
dertaken, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of 
directors or a high managerial agent acting within the scope of 
his employment. 
(5) In all actions arising under this section, the burden of 
proof is clear and convincing evidence. 
(6) The attorney general, county attorney, or, if within a 
prosecution district, the district attorney may maintain ac-
tions under this section on behalf of the state, the county, or 
any person injured by a person engaged in conduct forbidden 
by any provision of Section 76-10-1603, to prevent, restrain, or 
remedy injury as defined in this section and may recover the 
damages and costs allowed by this section. 
(7) In all actions under this section, the elements of each 
claim or cause of action shall be stated with particularity 
against each defendant. 
(8) If an action, claim, or counterclaim brought or asserted 
by a private party under this section is dismissed prior to trial 
or disposed of on summary judgment, or if it is determined at 
trial that there is no liability, the prevailing party shall 
recover from the party who brought the action or asserted the 
claim or counterclaim the amount of its reasonable expenses 
incurred because of the defense against the action, claim, or 
counterclaim, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
(9) An action or proceeding brought under this section shall 
be commenced within three years after the conduct prohibited 
by Section 76-10-1603 terminates or the cause of action 
accrues, whichever is later. This provision supersedes any 
limitation to the contrary. 
(10) (a) In any action brought under this section, the dis-
trict court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain, or remedy 
injury as defined by this section by issuing appropriate , 
orders after making provisions for the rights of innocent 
persons. 
(b) Before liability is determined in any action brought 
under this section, the district court may: 
(i) issue restraining orders and injunctions; 
(ii) require satisfactory performance bonds or any 
other bond it considers appropriate and necessary in 
connection with any property or any requirement 
imposed upon a party by the court; and 
(iii) enter any other order the court considers ne 
essary and proper. 
(c) After a determination of liability, the district com* 
may, in addition to granting the relief allowed in Subset 
tion (1), do any one or all of the following: 
(i) order any person to divest himself of any inter, 
est in or any control, direct or indirect, of any enter. 
prise; 
(ii) impose reasonable restrictions on the future 
activities or investments of any person, including 
prohibiting any person from engaging in the same 
type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, to the 
extent the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of 
the United States permit; or 
(iii) order the dissolution or reorganization of any 
enterprise. 
(d) However, if an action is brought to obtain any relief 
provided by this section, and if the conduct prohibited by 
Section 76-10-1603 has for its pattern of unlawful activity 
acts or conduct illegal under Section 76-10-1204, 76-10-
1205, 76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, the court may not enter 
any order that would amount to a prior restraint on the 
exercise of an affected party's rights under the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, or 
Article I, Sec. 15 of the Utah Constitution. The court shall, 
upon the request of any affected party, and upon the 
notice to all parties, prior to the issuance of any order 
provided for in this subsection, and at any later time, hold 
hearings as necessary to determine whether any materi-
als at issue are obscene or pornographic and to determine 
if there is probable cause to believe that any act or 
conduct alleged violates Section 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 
76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222. In making its findings the 
court shall be guided by the same considerations required 
of a court making similar findings in criminal cases 
brought under Section 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 76-10-
1206, or 76-10-1222, including, but not limited to, the 
definitions in Sections 76-10-1201, 76-10-1203, and 76-10-
1216, and the exemptions in Section 76-10-1226. 1993 
76-10-1606. Repealed. 1987 
76-10-1607. Evidentiary value of criminal judgment in 
civil proceeding. 
A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the state or 
a county in any criminal proceeding brought by this state or a 
county shall preclude the defendant from denying the essen-
tial allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil 
proceeding. 1981 
76-10-1608. Severability clause. 
If any part or application of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act is held invalid, the remainder of this part, or its 
application to other situations or persons, is not affected. 
1987 
76-10-1609. Prospective application. 
The amendments to the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity 
Act are prospective in nature and apply only to civil causes of 
action accruing after the effective date of this act. However, 
crimes committed prior to the effective date of this act may 
comprise part of a pattern of unlawful activity if at least one of 
the criminal episodes comprising that pattern occurs after the 
effective date of this act and the pattern otherwise meets the 
definition of pattern of unlawful activity as defined in Section 
76-10-1602. l** 
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DON S. REDD (#2705) 
Attorney at Law 
44 North Main 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Telephone: (801) 546-1264 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAZIAH MAY HANCOCK and ] 
CINDY STEWART, ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH ; 
OF JESUS CHRIST OF THE SAINTS ] 
OF THE LAST DAYS, ; 
JAMES D. HARMSTON, WILLIAM ] 
B. LTTHGOW, KErTH LARSON, ; 
DANIEL (DAN) SIMMONS, KAY ; 
CRABTREE, JEFF HANKS, ; 
BART MULSTROM, JOHN HARPER, ; 
and JOHN DOE'S NOS. 1 TO 5, ] 
Defendants. ] 
1 SECOND 
1 AMENDED COMPLAINT 
) Civil No. 980600126 
COMES NOW Don S. Redd, Attorney for and in behalf ,of Plaintiffs, Kaziah May Hancock 
(hereinafter "Ms. Hancock") and Cindy Stewart (hereinafter "Ms. Stewart") and Complains and 
alleges as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND PARTIES 
1. (a) That plaintiffs are individuals residing in Sanpete County, State of Utah. 
(b) Defendant "The True and Living Church of Jesus Christ of the Saints of the 
Last Days is an unincorporated entity headquartered in Sanpete County, State of Utah. 
(c) Defendant James D. Harmston ("Mr. Harmston") is an individual residing in 
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Sanpete County, State of Utah. 
(d) Defendant William B. lithgow is an individual who was residing in Sanpete 
County, State of Utah at the time of these causes of action. 
(e) Defendant Keith Larson is an individual residing in Sanpete County, State of 
Utah. 
(f) Defendant Daniel Simmons is an individual residing in Sanpete County, 
State of Utah. 
(g) Defendant Kay Crabtree is an individual who was residing in Sanpete 
County, State of Utah at the time of these causes of action. 
(h) Defendant Jeff Hanks is an individual who was residing in Sanpete County, 
State of Utah at the time of these causes of action. 
2. James D, Harmston is the founder and ultimate leader of the True and Living 
Church of Jesus Christ of The Saints of the Last Days, (hereinafter "the TLC") 
3. Mr. Harmston is also the head of an organization referred to as "The Church of the 
Firstborn." 
4. On or about November of 1993 Ms. Hancock became affiliated with the True and 
Living Church of Jesus Christ of The Saints of the Last Days. 
5. On or about April 11, 1995 Ms. Stewart became affiliated with the True and Living 
Church of Jesus Christ of The Saints of the Last Days. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(BREACH OF CONTRACT -- all defendants) 
6. In support of her First Cause of Action, Plaintiffs re-allege each and every allegation 
contained in paragraphs #1 through #5 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
7. After becoming affiliated with the TLC the Plaintiffs were induced by Mr. 
Harmston and his religious subordinates to liquidate their assets and place them into the control of 
the Defendants. 
8. On or about March 25, 1996 the Plaintiff, Kaziah May Hancock, met with the 
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"Bishopric" of the TLC, Keith Larson, Kay Crabtree, and Kent Braddy, to establish a stewardship 
for her in exchange for her contribution of money and time to the TLC. 
9. In exchange for money, goods, and services to be given by the Plaintiff, Kaziah May 
Hancock, to the Defendants the Plaintiff was assured and promised by the TLC and/or its 
representatives that she would receive back a "stewardship" of property and support in exchange for 
the funds she "consecrated" to the TLC. 
10. As a further inducement for the Plaintiff to "consecrate" her wealth over to the 
Defendants, Plaintiff was promised by Mr. Harmston that they would become members of The 
Church of the Firstborn and would meet Christ face to face. 
Cindy Stewart liquidated her entire retirement savings at the insistence of Mr. 
Harmston and turned all the funds over to him for the use of the TLC. 
Harmston and other acting as TLC officers promised Cindy Stewart full repayment 
of her money plus payment of all her costs and losses for early withdrawal of her retirement funds. 
11. Kaziah May Hancock did deliver money, goods and services to the Defendants after 
this time and continued to do so until Ms. Stewart was excommunicated in or about May 1997 and 
Ms. Hancock was asked to leave in or about August 1997. 
12. Plaintiff, Kaziah May Hancock, never received a "stewardship" of any kind as 
promised. 
13. Plaintiff, Kaziah May Hancock, never met Christ face to face as promised. 
14. Plaintiff, Cindy Stewart was never repaid her retirement or the costs and penalties 
she incurred for the early withdrawal. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(FRAUD/CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD/NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION - all defendants) 
15. In support of their Second Cause of Action, Plaintiffs re-allege each and every 
allegation contained in paragraphs #1 through #14 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
16. By appealing to the Plaintiffs deepest spiritual needs and commitments, Mr. 
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Harmston, along with other Defendants, persuaded the Plaintiffs that Mr. Harmston was the sole 
spokesman on earth for God and thus gained the confidence of the Plaintiffs. 
17. After gaining a superior position of confidence with the Plaintiffs, Mr. Harmston 
and other Defendants took unfair advantage of that position by persuading the Plaintiffs that they 
must turn over their wealth to the Defendants. 
18. Promises were made by many of the Defendants, including Mr. Harmston, acting in 
his own person and as an agent of the TLC to Ms. Hancock that if she sold her ranch in Indianola 
and consecrated her assets to the TLC, she would receive back a "stewardship," or a place where 
she could continue to raise her animals. 
19. Promises were made by Mr. Harmston, acting in his own person and as an agent of 
the TLC, to Ms. Stewart that if she liquidated her IRA account and consecrate the monies from the 
account to him he would repay her and pay any tax liability she would incur for early withdrawal. 
20. Mr. Harmston, acting in his own person and as an agent of the TLC, also promised 
Ms. Stewart that she shouldn't be concerned about giving up her IRA account because he and/or the 
TLC would always take care of her. 
21. Mr. Harmston, along with other officers of the TLC: 
(i) made representations to the Plaintiffs promising future performance; 
(ii) the statements of future performance was false; 
(iii) the false statements of future performance was material; 
(iv) the Defendants either knew that the statements of future performance 
made to the Plaintiffs were false or were ignorant of their truth; 
(v) the Defendants intended that the Plaintiffs would act upon the false 
statements and in the manner reasonably contemplated; 
(vi) the Plaintiffs were ignorant of the falsity of the statements of future 
performance made to them by the Defendants; 
(vii) the Plaintiffs relied on the false statements of future performance made to 
them by the Defendants; 
(viii) The Plaintiffs had a right to rely on the statements of future performance 
to be true; 
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(ix) The Plaintiffs turned over their property and means to Mr. Harmston and/or 
the TLC and consequently suffered the loss and conversion of nearly all their assets. 
22. Plaintiffs allege that the above actions were intentional on the part of Mr. Harmston 
acting in his own person and/or as an agent of the TLC, and some of the Defendants, and constitute 
actual fraud; or the above actions were unintentional on the part of the Defendants and constitute 
constructive fraud and/or negligent misrepresentation. 
23. Failure to perform on a future promise constitutes a false statement under the 
circumstances required by law and/or equity as follows: 
(i) the promisor(s) had a pecuniary interest in the transaction; [Galloway v. 
AFCO Development Corp. 777 P.2d 506 (Utah App 1989)]. 
(ii) the promisor(s) had control over whether or not the promise was fulfilled; 
["Statements ... relating to future events may be actionable ... where the 
future event is full within the declarant's control.1' 37 C.J.S. 14(b) (Fraud); 
also Logan Equipment Co. v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 736 F.Supp. 1188. 
"Generally, redress may be had... for an unfulfilled promise to perform in 
the future made with the undisclosed intention not to perform, or without 
the intention to perform, and for the purpose of inducing action." 37 C.J.S. 
15 (Fraud)]. 
(iii) the promise has a fiduciary, confidential, or superior relationship with the 
promisee; 
["Where a relation of trust and confidence exists between two parties, so 
that one of them places peculiar reliance in the other's trustworthiness, the 
latter is liable for representations as to future conduct, and not merely as to 
past facts." 37 C.J.S. 14(b) (Fraud); also Southern Mortg. Co. v. O'Dom, 
699 F.Supp 1227; Stewart v. Phoenix Nat. Bank, 64 P .2d 101, 49 Ariz. 34; 
Edmunds v. Valley Circle Estates, 2 Dist., 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 16 C.A. 4 
1290]. 
Plaintiff alleges that some or all three of the above exceptions existed in their relationships and 
dealings with the Defendants. 
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(FRAUDULENT CONVERSION or in the alternative UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT/IMPLIED CONTRACT - all defendants) 
24. In support of their Third Cause of Action, Plaintiffs re-allege each and every 
allegation contained in paragraphs #1 through #23 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
25. Defendants have acquired about two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00) 
of money, services, or property from Ms. Hancock, and fifteen thousand seven hundred sixty-six 
dollars ($15,766.00) from Ms. Stewart by fraudulent conversion and/or unjust enrichment. The bulk 
of Ms. Stewart's money represented a retirement account awarded her in a divorce settlement and 
constituted nearly all of her assets. 
26. Defendants have breached an implied contract with Plaintiffs by refusing to provide 
valuable consideration, as promised, in the full amount of money, services, or property taken by the 
Defendants. 
27. By receiving or taking money, services, or property from Plaintiffs without 
providing equal value in return, Defendant's have been unjustly enriched to Plaintiffs detriment. 
28. As a result of Defendants unjust enrichment, Ms. Hancock have been damaged in 
the amount of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00); and Ms. Stewart has been 
damaged in the amount of fifteen thousand seven hundred sixty-six dollars ($15,766.00), plus pre-
judgment interest accruing since the time of the conversion of their money as permitted by Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 (hereinafter "U.C.A.")15-1-1(2). 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(RACKETEERING - all defendants) 
29. In support of their Fourth Cause of Action, Plaintiffs re-alleges each and every 
allegation contained in paragraphs #1 through #28 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
30. Plaintiffs allege that the TLC qualifies as a racketeering enterprise under the Utah 
Criminal Code "Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act" U.C.A. 76-10-1601 et. seq. Defendants 
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affiliated with the TLC have committed at least three acts in violation of the "Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act." Defendants violations are stated in particularity as follows: 
(a) James D. Harmston and each other Defendant in conjunction with 
their leadership positions in the TLC and "The Church of the Firstborn", has 
violated the Utah Criminal Code "Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act" U.C.A. 76-10-
1601 et. seq. They have engaged in unlawful activity. Some of these unlawful activities are 
including, but not limited to: Theft by Deception, U.C.A. 76-6-405; Theft of Services, 
U.C.A. 76-6-409; Unlawful Dealing with Property by Fiduciary, U.C.A. 76-6-513; 
Communications Fraud, U.C.A. 76-10-1801, either directly or did aid and abet other 
Defendant's by some or all of the above actions. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
HARM « all defendants) 
31. In support of their Fifth Cause of Action, Plaintiffs re-allege each and every 
allegation contained in paragraphs #1 through #30 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 
32. Plaintiffs have suffered great mental anguish and pain as a result of the loss from 
their life savings effected by the conversion their money by the Defendants. 
33. The actions of the Defendants named in this Complaint have significantly harmed 
and damaged the Plaintiffs. 
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the Defendants individually and 
severally and in their favor as follows: 
1. An award of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00) representing the 
actual value of money, goods, and services fraudulently converted from Ms. Hancock to the 
Defendant's use; and an award of fifteen thousand seven hundred sixty-six dollars ($15,766.00) 
representing the actual value of money received from Ms. Stewart by fraudulent conversion. 
2. An award of interest accruing at ten percent per annum on the amount of money 
converted from the Plaintiffs to the Defendant's use as allowed by Utah Code Annotated 15-1-1 
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since the date of the conversion. 
3. An award of damages as allowed as a civil penalty by Utah's "Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act," Utah Code Annotated 76-10-1605 et. seq. equal to double the total amount of 
Plaintiffs actual damages in the loss of their principle plus accrued interest, and costs of litigation 
including reasonable attorney fees. 
4. An award of punitive damages as allowed by, and in keeping with, Utah Code 
Annotated 78-18-1 et. seq. in the amount of treble the total amount of Plaintiffs actual damages in 
the loss of their principle plus accrued interest. 
5. An award of two hundred fifty thousand ($250,000.00) for the mental anguish 
suffered by Cindy Stewart and Ms. Hancock which represents the amount of the funds taken from 
her; and as award of fifteen thousand seven hundred sixty-six dollars ($15,766.00) for the mental 
anguish suffered by Ms. Stewart which represents the amount of the funds taken from her. 
6. An award of attorney's fees and costs. 
7. And such other relief as the court deems appropriate. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J2. day of February 2003. 
DON S: REDD, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 
44 North Main 
Layton, Utah 84041 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Amended Complaint was 
mailed on the \ \ day of February 2003 by depositing same in the U.S. Mail to the following: 
John H. Jacobs 
Attorney for Crabtree 
75 N. Center St. 
American Fork, UT 84003 
F. Kevin Bond 
Budge W. Call 
Mark S. Middlemas 
Attorneys for Defendants 
311 S. State Suite 410 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Keith Larson 
111 West Center 
Snowflake, AZ 85937 
Clark R. Nielsen 
Attorney at Law 
68 S. Main St., Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
William Lithgow 
37550 Pine Knoll Ave 
Palm Desert, CA 92211 
Secretary 
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THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST OF SAINTS OF THE LAST 
DAYS, JAMES D. HARMSTON, WILLIAM 
B. LITHGOW, KEITH LARSON, DANIEL 
(DAN) SIMMONS, KAY CRABTREE, 
KENT BRADDY, JEFF HANKS, BART 
MUSTROM, JOHN HARPER and JOHN 
DOES NOS. 1-5, 
Defendants. 
DECISION IN REGARDS TO 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 980600126 
Assigned Judge: DAVID L. MOWER 
A portion of this case is presently at issue and ready for a decision. The issue is raised by 
the combination of the Amended Complaint and a Motion to Dismiss. 
The Amended Complaint was filed on March 10, 1999. The Motion to Dismiss was filed 
on March 14, 2003 by Attorney Kevin Bond on behalf of the defendants represented by him. 
INTRODUCTION 
The analytical method to be used is this: Assume that the complaint is true and then 
analyze its claims to see if any are deficient. 
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ANALYSIS 
The Amended Complaint contains five separate claims or causes of action. I intend to 
analyze each one separately. 
Part One - First Cause of Action 
"BREACH OF CONTRACT-ALL DEFENDANTS." The analytical method I prefer to 
use is to search for the verbs in the language of the document. This helps me focus in on the 
most relevant language of the claim. This method has led me to the following language which is 
quoted directly from paragraphs 9,11, and 12 of the Amended Complaint. I believe that this 
language is the essence of the claim in the first cause of action. 
Plaintiffs were... promised by the [defendants] that they would 
receive ... a "stewardship" of property or support ,„ . 
Plaintiffs did deliver money, goods, and services .... 
Plaintiffs never received a "stewardship ...." 
There are two types of defendants in this case, individuals and organizations. Two 
organizations are referred to by name in the Amended Complaint. One of those is "The True and 
Living Church of Jesus Christ of The Saints of the Last Days." The other is "The Church of the 
Firstborn," 
The Amended Complaint contains several instances of words in quotation marks. I will 
list them here. 
utheTLC" 
/Z65 





Sometimes an author uses quotation marks to signify words with special or unique 
meaning based on circumstances or relationships. That could certainly be true in this case. 
However, the drafter of the Amended Complaint has not explained the reason for placing certain 
words in quotation marks. I will use the common dictionary definitions for these words. 
Here are two of those definitions: 
Stewardship 
Pronunciation: 'stiiti-&rd-uship, 'styiifi-; 'st(y)u(-&)rd-
Function: noun 
Date: 15th century 
1 : the office, duties, and obligations of a steward 
2 : the conducting, supervising, or managing of something; 
especially : the careful and responsible management of something 
entrusted to one's care stewardship of our natural resources> 
Steward 
Pronunciation: 'stuU-fcrd, 'stytiti-; fst(y)u(-&)rd 
Function: noun 
Etymology: Middle English, from Old English stlweard, from stl, 
stig hall, sty + weard ward - more at STY, WARD 
Date: before 12th century 
1 : one employed in a large household or estate to manage 
domestic concerns (as the supervision of servants, collection of 
rents, and keeping of accounts) 
2 : SHOP STEWARD 
3 : a fiscal agent 
4 a : an employee on a ship, airplane, bus, or train who manages 
the provisioning of food and attends passengers b : one appointed 
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to supervise the provision and distribution of food and drink in an 
institution 
5 : one who actively directs affairs : MANAGER 
Merriam-Webster On-Une Dictionary (www.m-w.com) 
Since a stewardship is a noun then it is a thing. One may wonder if the right to manage 
someone else's property is a thing of value. However, the analysis here is not concerned with 
value, only with whether or not a claim is stated. Here we have this claim: I was promised one 
thing in exchange for another. I gave but didn't receive. I am entitled. 
My conclusion is that a claim is stated. 
Part Two - Second Cause of Action 
"FRAUD/CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD/NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION - all 
defendants." 
Part 2.a. - Second Cause of Action - Fraud 
The words "fraud" and "particularity" have become linked by the jurisprudence of our 
state. For example, see P36 of Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and 
Others, 21 P.3d 200, Utah Supreme Court, 2001. 1 refer specifically to this sentence: "We have 
stressed, and continue to hold, that mere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a 
recitation of relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude ... summary judgment." 
As I read the text of this cause of action I looked for information about particular dates, 
times, places, names of peoplXworSTtha^^e spoken. I found none. Hence the cause of action 
is deficient and should be dismissed. J 
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Part 2.b> Second Cause of Action - Constructive Fraud 
Constructive Fraud must also be plead with particularity. The complaint is lacking in 
particulars about times, places, names of people, words that were spoken. This cause of action is 
deficient and should be dismissed. 
Part 2.c. - Second Cause of Action - Negligent Misrepresentation 
This cause of action is plead as an alternative to Constructive Frauft-itehQi^d contain the 
same specific information as the fraud claims. Since it does not it is deficient and should'be 
dismissed. 
Part Three - Third Cause of Action 
"FRAUDULENT CONVERSION 01 in the alternative UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT/IMPLIED CONTRACT-all Defendants." 
The special words from this cause or action are: 
Defendants have acquired ... money ... by fraudulent conversion 
and/or [sic] unjust enrichment. 
Defendants have breached an implied contract... by refusing to 
provide ... valuable consideration, as promised in the full 
amount.... 
... Defendants have been unjustly enriched. 
This cause of action is essentially the same as the first cause since its resolution depends 
on the value of a stewardship. The Third Cause of Action does state a claim and will not be 
dismissed. 
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Part Four - Fourth Cause of Action 
"RACKETEERING - all Defendants." 
Private, civil lawsuits are authorized for violation of Utah's Racketeering Enterprises Act. 
The authorization is found in Section 76-10-1605(1), Utah Code. 
The same statute requires that the elements of each claim be stated with particularity. See 
Section 76-10-1605(7). 
There is nothing in the fourth cause ©faction that refers to particular dates, times, places, 
people, words or actionsLHence, this cause of action is deficient and should be dismissed. 
Part Five - Fifth Cause of Action 
"INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL HARM - All Defendants." 
A required element of this tort relates to intent. More specifically, the element relates to 
the defendants* intent. The element is that the defendant" „, intended to cause, or acted in 
reckless disregard of the likelihood of causing, emotional distress ..,." Retherford v. AT&T 
Communications of the Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 970-971 (Utah Supreme Court 
1992), 
The Complaint is silent as to this element. Hence it is deficient, and the cause of action 
should be dismissed, 
Mr. Bond is appointed to draft an appropriate order and to submit it for execution by 
following the procedure set forth in Rule 4-504. 
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; L. Mower 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On August 1 , 2003 a copy of this DECISION IN REGARDS TO MOTION TO 
DISMISS was sent by M=first- class mail, P=Clerk's office pickup box, F=Fax to: 
Addressee 
F, Kevin Bond 
Budge W. Call 
311 S. State, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Method Addressee 
M Don S. Redd 
Clark R. Nielsen 
44 North Main 







DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUNTY, UTAH 
160 North Main 
Manti, Utah 84642 
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THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST OF SAINTS OF THE LAST 
DAYS, et al., 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTION TO FILE 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Case No. 980600126 
Assigned Judge: DAVTD L. MOWER 
The Plaintiffs have made a motion to file an amended complaint. It was accompanied by 
a proposed pleading entitled Third Amended Complaint. There have been memoranda filed in 
opposition to the motion, and it is now ripe and ready for decision. 
DECISION 
The motion should be denied. 
ANALYSIS 
The motion is not timely. Were it to be granted, it would require the fact finder to judge 
church doctrine which is not allowed. Were it to be allowed, it alleges actions by Ivan Douglas 
Jordan, who is not a party to this action, and complete relief could not be afforded. Mr. Call is 
1611 
ORDER ON MOTION TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT, Case number 980600126, Page -2-
appointed to draft an appropriate order and submit it for execution by following the procedures 
set forth in Rule 4-504 CJA. 
Date H OC* , 2003 <t\$4Jj~-
David L. Mower 
District Court Judge 
Certificate of Notification 
On A(^ . \ {]y , 2003, a copy of the above was sent to: 
Name 
Don S. Redd 
Attorney at Law 
John H. Jacobs 
Attorney for Crabtree 
F. Kevin Bond 
Budge W. Call 
Mark S. Middlemas 




44 N. Main 
Layton, Utah 84041 
75 N. Center St. 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
311 S. State, Suite 410 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
68 S. Main St., Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
37550 Pine Knoll Ave. 
Palm Desert, CA 92211 
524 W. Juniper 
Snowflake, AZ 85937 
X 
TabH 
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THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH OF JESUS 
CHRIST OF THE SAINTS OF THE LAST 
DAYS, JAMES D. HARMSTON, WILLIAM B. 
LITHGOW, KEITH LARSON, DANIEL (DAN) 
SIMMONS, KAY CRABTREE, KENT 
BRADDY, PHILLIP P. SAVAGE, JEFF HANKS, 
AND JOHN DOES 1-5 
Defendant's. 
1 VERDICT 
| Case No. 980600126 
Assigned Judge: DAVID L. MOWER 
The jury has made a decision. 
1. There was a breach of contract by at least one of the defendants. V Yes No (If 
you answered "No," skip to question 3.) 
2. The Court should order the defendants to pay because of the breach of contract. 
VERDICT, Case number 980600126, Page -2-
A. To Cindy Stewart $ 11^8''34 
B. To Kaziah May Hancock $ 13 j . 7^Q ' GO 
3. There was fraud or misrepresentation by at least one defendant. V Yes No (If 
you answered "No," skip to question 5.) 
4. The Court should order the defendants to pay because of the fraud or misrepresentation. 
A. To Cindy Stewart $ l£ft77-'C)% 
B. To Kaziah May Hancock $ / 5 A 7^D'0£f 
5. At least one defendant was unjustly enriched. Yes v No (If you answered 
"No," skip to question 7.) 
6. How much money should the Court order the defendants to pay because of unjust 
enrichment? 
VERDICT, Case number 980600126, Page -3-
A. To Cindy Stewart $ 
B, To Kaziah May Hancock $ 
7. At least one defendant engaged in racketeering. 
"No," skip to question 9.) 
8. How much money should the Court order the defendants to pay because of the 
racketeering? 
A. To Cindy Stewart $ 
B. To Kaziah May Hancock $ 
9. There was intentional infliction of emotional distress by at least one defendant. 
V Yes No (If you answered "No," then your work is finished. Have the Jury 
Chair sign this Verdict and then notify the bailiff that you are ready to return to Court.) 
Yes V No (If you answered 
VERDICT, Case number 980600126, Page -4-
10. How much money should the Court order the defendants to pay because of the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress? 
A. To Cindy Stewart %£JJ£Q1 oo 
\. To Kaziah May Hancock %b.!?Ob 'l 
Signed on (kn £$ , 2002 
Tab I 
DON S. REDD #2705 
Attorney at Law 
44 North Main 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Telephone: (801)546-1264 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAZIAH MAY HANCOCK, and ; 
CINDY STEWART, ; 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH ; 
OF JESUS CHRIST OF SAINTS OF ; 
THE LAST DAYS, JAMES D. ; 
HARMSTON, WILLIAM B. LITHGOW, ; 
KEITH LARSON, DANIEL (DAN) ) 
SIMMONS, KAY CRABTREE, AND ] 
KENT BRADDY, ) 
Defendants. ) 
) FOURTH PROPOSED JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 980600126 
) Judge David L. Mower 
This matter was tried before a jury in Manti, Utah on January 22, 23, 24 and 25. The 
jury returned their verdict on the 28 day of January, 2002. 
Plaintiffs KAZIAH MAY HANCOCK, and CINDY STEWART were present with their 
attorney, Don S. Redd, Defendants THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST 
OF SAINTS OF THE LAST DAYS, JAMES D. HARMSTON, DANIEL (DAN) SIMMONS, 
AND KENT BRADDY were present with their Attorney, Mark Middlemas. Defendants 
WILLIAM B. LITHGOW, KEITH LARSON AND KAY CRABTREE were not present, but 
were represented by Mark Middlemas. 
5 r O ' n 
DY 
%Q 
The jury having reached their verdict and were unanimous on all portions there of, it is 
hereby ordered and adjudged as follows: 
1. The defendants The True and Living Church of Jesus Christ of Saints of the Last 
Days, James D. Harmston, William B. Lithgow, Keith Larson, Daniel (Dan) Simmons, Kay 
Crabtree and Kent Braddy did breach a contract with each Plaintiff. 
2. Judgment is entered against each defendant The True and Living Church of Jesus 
Christ of Saints of the Last Days, James D. Harmston, William B. Lithgow, Keith Larson, Daniel 
(Dan) Simmons, Kay Crabtree and Kent Braddy jointly and severally in the amount of $1,748.34 
plus interest of $1,137.76 from October 14, 1996 to January 14, 2002 for a total of $2,886.10 in 
favor of Cindy Stewart for breach of contract 
3. Judgment is entered against each defendant The True and Living Church of Jesus 
Christ of Saints of the Last Days, James D. Harmston, William B. Lithgow, Keith Larson, Daniel 
(Dan) Simmons, Kay Crabtree and Kent Braddy jointly and severally in the amount of 
$131,750.00 plus interest of $101,165.00 from June 1, 1996 to January 28, 2002 for a total of 
$226,332.00 for breach of contract in favor of Kaziah May Hancock. 
4. There was fraud and misrepresentation by defendants The True and Living 
Church of Jesus Christ of Saints of the Last Days, James D. Harmston, William B. Lithgow, 
Keith Larson, Daniel (Dan) Simmons, Kay Crabtree and Kent Braddy against Plaintiff Kaziah 
May Hancock and Plaintiff Cindy Stewart 
5. Judgment is entered against defendant The True and Living Church of Jesus Christ 
of Saints of the Last Days, James D. Harmston, William B. Lithgow, Keith Larson, Daniel (Dan) 
Simmons, Kay Crabtree and Kent Braddy jointly and severally in the amount of $12,077.02 plus 
2 
$7,859.39 interest from October 14, 1996 to January 14, 2002 for a total of $19,936.41 for fraud 
and misrepresentation in favor of Cindy Stewart. 
6. Judgment is entered against defendants The True and Living Church of Jesus 
Christ of Saints of the Last Days, James D. Harmston, William B. Lithgow, Keith Larson, Daniel 
(Dan) Simmons, Kay Crabtree and Kent Braddy jointly and severally in the amount of 
$131,750.00 plus interest of $101,165.00 from June 1, 1996 to January 28, 2002 for a total of 
$226,332.00 for fraud and misrepresentation in favor of Kaziah May Hancock. 
7. Defendants The True and Living Church of Jesus Christ of Saints of the Last 
Days, James D. Harmston, William B. Lithgow, Keith Larson, Daniel (Dan) Simmons, Kay 
Crabtree and Kent Braddy intentionally inflicted emotional distress on plaintiff Cindy Stewart. 
Defendants The True and Living Church of Jesus Christ of Saints of the Last Days, James D. 
Harmston, William B. Lithgow, Keith Larson, Daniel (Dan) Simmons, Kay Crabtree and Kent 
Braddy intentionally inflicted emotional distress on plaintiff Kaziah May Hancock. 
8. For their intentional infliction of emotional distress, Judgment is entered against 
defendants jointly and severally in the amount of $6,500.00 in favor of Cindy Stewart. 
9. Judgment is entered against defendants The True and Living Church of Jesus 
Christ of Saints of the Last Days, James D. Harmston, William B. Lithgow, Keith Larson, Daniel 
(Dan) Simmons, Kay Crabtree and Kent Braddy jointly and severally in the amount of $6,500.00 
in favor of Kaziah May Hancock. 
10. All judgments accrue interest at the statutory rate for Judgments. 
11. Petitioners are awarded their attorney fees on the grounds and in the amount 
found by the court. 
3 
12. Plaintiffs are also awarded any costs including attorney fees necessary to collect 
these judgments 
13. Plaintiffs are also awarded their costs incurred under Rule 54 Utah Rules of Civii^ 
Procedure in the amount of $ 1,000.67 (see attached Memorandum of Costs and Distesjgatenjs). ^ C/* 
JuUf * ^ ^' } 
DATED this Ji_ day of June, 2002. 
DAVID L. MOWER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDG 
"5i s!t '** MAILING CERTIFICATE ^ 5 ^ 1 ' i ^ 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FOURTH PROPOSED 
JUDGMENT was mailed on this ^ O day of June 2002 by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid to the following: 
John H.Jacobs 
Attorney for Crabtree 
75 N. Center St. 
American Fork, UT 84003 
°C 
F Kevin Bond 
Budge W. Call 
Mark S. Middlemas 
Attorneys for Defendants 
311 S. State Suite 410 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
William Lithgow 
37550 Pine Knoll Ave 
Palm Desert, CA 92211 
Keith Larson 
111 West Center 
Snowflake, AZ 85937 
Clark R. Nielsen 
Attorney at Law 
576 East South Temple Street 




CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 980600126 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail KEITH LARSON 
DEFENDANT 
111 West Center 
Snowflake, AZ 85937 
Mail WILLIAM B. LITHGOW 
DEFENDANT 
37550 Pine Knoll Ave 
Palm Desert CA 92211 
Mail F KEVIN BOND 
ATTORNEY DEF 
311 SOUTH STATE, SUITE 410 
SUITE 410 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Mail BUDGE W CALL 
ATTORNEY DEF 
311 SOUTH STATE 
SUITE 410 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Mail JOHN H. JACOBS 
ATTORNEY DEF 
75 NORTH CENTER STREET 
AMERICAN FORK UT 84003 
Mail CLARK R NIELSEN 
ATTORNEY PLA 
57 6 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
Mail DON S REDD 
ATTORNEY PLA 
44 NORTH MAIN 
LAYTON UT 84 041 
Dated this day of C (- 'L<- 4 <^ -<3U O 20_0i_ 
2k tt~\U^K^ UC'Ctc^L 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 
Tab J 
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THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST OF SAINTS OF THE LAST 
DAYS, et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON MOTIONS REGARDING 
JUDGMENT AND NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 980600126 
Assigned Judge: David. L. Mower 
Several motions are pending in this case. The subject matter of the motions concerns 
what to do with the jury verdict and how to convert it into an enforceable judgment. I have 
reviewed the file several times over the past several weeks with a view to entering a judgment. 
I am convinced that the task is impossible. The verdict did not require the jury to provide 
enough detailed information about the plaintiffs' claims, the defendants' actions and how they 
relate to each other. 
Hence, no judgment will be entered. The motion for a new trial is granted. Mr. Call is 
appointed to draft an appropriate order and to submit it for execution by following the procedure 
set forth in rule 4-504, Code of Judicial Administration. 
It) 
ORDER ON MOTIONS REGARDING JUDGMENT AND NEW TRIAL, Case number 
980600126, Page-2-
The Court Clerk is directed to arrange for a scheduling conference to be held on the 
record in Manti, At that conference the Court will establish a case management plan with 
deadlines and a trial date. 
Dated this ( day of January, 2003. 
David L. Mower 
District Court Judge \ , ^2s 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~l ,Te». 
On tesss&y , 2003 a copy of the above ORDER ON MOTIONS REGARDING 
JUDGMENT AND NEW TRIAL was sent to each of the following by the method indicated: 
Addressee Method (M=mail, P=in person, F=Fax) Addressee Method (M-mail. P=in person, F=Fax> 
Mail John H. Jacobs Mail 
Clark R. Nielsen 
68 South Main St. Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
John H. Jacobs 
75 N. Center St. 
American Fork, UT 84003 
F. Kevin Bond 
Budge W. Call 
Mark S. Middlemas 
BOND & CALL 
311 South State, Suite 410 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mail William Lithgow 
37550 Pine Knoll Ave. 
Palm Desert, CA 92211 
Mail 
ORDER ON MOTIONS REGARDING JUDGMENT AND NEW TRIAL, Case number 
980600126, Page-3-
Keith Larson Mail Don S. Redd Mail 
111 West Center 44 North Main Street 
Snowflake, AZ 85937 Layton, UT 84041 
Beputy Clerk 
TabK 
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DON S. REDD #2705 
Attorney at Law 
44 North Main 
Layton,Utah 84041 
Telephone: (801) 546-1264 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAZIAH MAY HANCOCK AND ] 
CINDY STEWART ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ) 
THE TRUE AND LIVING CHURCH ) 
OF JESUS CHRIST OF SAINTS OF ] 
THE LAST DAYS, JAMES D. ; 
HARMSTON, WILLIAM B. LITHGOW, ] 
KEITH LARSON, DANIEL (DAN) ; 
SIMMONS, KAY CRABTREE, ; 
JEFF HANKS, BART MULSTROM, ; 
JOHN HARPER, JOHN DOE'S NOS. 1-5 ; 
Defendants. ] 
> ORDER CONTINUING TRIAL 
) Civil No. 980600126 
) Judge David L. Mower 
BASED upon the parties Stipulation and Agreement, it is hereby ORDERED as 
follows: 
1. The Court hereby directs its Orders of August 7, 2003 dismissing three of 
Petitioners' claims for relief and upholding the other two Claims for relief and its Order 
of October 16, 2003, denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, is entered as a final Judgment. 
<M3 Hi}\] 22 P P M ?6 
;535 
2. That the Trial presently scheduled for October 28, 2003 is continued 
pending the appeal of these Judgments. 
DATED this *> d^^Q^faer , 2003. 
APPROVED AS 
®BGECAC 
Attorney for Defendants^e True 
and Living Church of Jesus Christ-
of Saints of the Last Days, James D 
Harmston, Daniel Simmons, Kent 
Braddy, Bart Mulstrom and 
John Harper 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
CONTINUING TRIAL was mailed on this ^J] day of October, 2003 by depositing same 
in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
F. Kevin Bond 
Budge W. Call 
Mark S. Middlemas 
Attorneys for Defendants 
311 S. State Suite 410 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Keith Larson 
524 W. Juniper 
Snowflake, AZ 85937 
Clark R. Nielsen 
Attorney at Law 
68 S. Main St., Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
William Lithgow 
37550 Pine Knoll Ave 
Palm Desert, CA 92211 
Kay Crabtree 
P.O. Box 427 
Babb,MT 59411 ^ C*JoJLd^^r*^AA\ 
Secretary 
